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INTRODUCTION
The recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR” or
“Court”) with regard to the presence of the Catholic symbol of the crucifix in
Italian public schools1 are just the latest episodes of the ongoing juridical and
political struggle for the secularization of the Italian state. This debate involves
the interpretation and the enactment of the Italian Constitution as well as the
political and cultural trends that shape the Italian public debate about the
public role of religion. Until 2009, the debate basically concerned the
constitutional values of religious freedom and equality, but had also touched
upon the role of religion—namely the Catholic Church—in Italian public life.2
The decisions of the ECHR, which operates in Strasbourg,3 pushed the
debate further: from the interpretation of the Italian Constitution4 to the respect
for international treaties.5 In the first degree, the Court found Italy’s policy of
displaying crucifixes in public schools violated Article 9 of the 1950
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“European Convention on Human Rights”) that protects the right to freedom
of religion.6 The popular and political criticisms of the judgment were

1 The first decision was delivered as a chamber judgment on November 3, 2009. Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2009) [hereinafter Lautsi I], http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law”
hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Lautsi” in the “Case Title” box and
“Italy” in the “Respondent State” box). After the Italian government requested that the case be referred to the
Grand Chamber, the second decision was released by the Grand Chamber on March 18, 2011. Lautsi v. Italy,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi II], http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_EN (follow “CaseLaw” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Lautsi” in the “Case Title” box and
“Italy” in the “Respondent State” box).
2 See generally CARLO CARDIA, LE SFIDE DELLA LAICITÀ ETICA, MULTICULTURALISMO, ISLAM (2007);
LUCA DIOTALLEVI, UNA ALTERNATIVA ALLA LAICITÀ (2010); GUSTAVO ZAGREBELSKY, SCAMBIARSI LA
VESTE STATO E CHIESA AL GOVERNO DELL’UOMO (2010).
3 Visitors, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Visitors/Information+
for+visiting+groups/How+to+request+a+visit (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
4 See Stefano Sicardi, Alcuni Problemi della Laicità in Versione Italiana, STATO, CHIESE E PLURALISMO
CONFESSIONALE, 15 (Mar. 2010), http://www.statoechiese.it/images/stories/2010.3/sicardi_alcunim.pdf.
5 See Fulvio Cortese & Silvia Mirate, La CEDU e il Crocifisso: Prodromi, Motivi e Conseguenze di una
Pronuncia Tanto Discussa, FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI, 1 (July–Dec. 2009), http://www.
forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0167_cortese_mirate.pdf.
6 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
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immediate and forceful throughout Italian public discourse, because a majority
in Italian society supports the presence of the crucifix in public schools.7 The
decision thus revealed rising skepticism toward the ECHR and its role in
protecting human rights because Italian majority opinion contrasted so strongly
with the Court’s position on such a fundamental right as religious freedom—as
well as its related principles, such as the separation of church and state and the
issue of the role of religion in a pluralistic society. The recent decision, which
was given by the Grand Chamber, reversed the first degree’s decision
upholding the display of the crucifix.8 Therefore, the decision is probably
going to diminish the criticism toward the ECHR.
Like many countries in the Western world, Italy has a complicated churchstate relationship.9 Various scholars have demonstrated the difficulty in
defining the bounds of the two spheres of church and state in countries of
different traditions.10 Italy has proved to be a crossroads of many different
approaches to the relationship between church and state.11 This is especially
true in the case of the display of religious symbols in public institutions, such
as public schools.12

the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, opened for signature Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights] (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953).
7 According to some polls, 84% of Italians disagreed with the ECHR decision and were in favor of the
display of the crucifix in public schools. Il Crocefisso Torna Davanti ai Guidici Europei di Strasburgo¸ ITALIA
DALL’ESTERO (June 30, 2010), http://italiadallestero.info/archives/9699.
8 See Lautsi II, supra note 1.
9 For a discussion on a Spanish example, see Maria del Carmen Garcimartín Montero, La Laicidad en
las Cortes Constituyentes de 1978, 72 IUS CANONICUM 539, 539–94 (1996), and María J. Roca, La
Neutralidad del Estado: Fundamento Doctrinal y Actual Delimitación en la Jurisprudencia, 48 REVISTA
ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 251, 251–72 (1996). For a discussion on a French example, see
PAOLO CAVANA, INTERPRETAZIONI DELLA LAICITÀ ESPERIENZA FRANCESE ED ESPERIENZA ITALIANA A
CONFRONTO (1998).
10 Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2255, 2272 (1997). See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Lasia Bloss, European Law of Religion—
Organizational and Institutional Analysis of National Systems and Their Implications for the Future European
Integration Process (The Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 13/03, 2003), http://centers.law.nyu.edu/
jeanmonnet/papers/03/031301.pdf.
11 Augusto Barbera, Il Cammino della Laicità, FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI, pt. 3 (2007),
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/nuovi%20pdf/Paper/0036_barbera.pdf.
12 This is a common feature of the international debate about the relationship between religion and state.
For a discussion on a French example, see HAUT CONSEIL À L’INTÉGRATION, CHARTE DE LA LAÏCITÉ DANS
LES SERVICES PUBLICS ET AUTRES AVIS 191–209 (2007), http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgi-
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The word that is classically used by scholars as well as by courts to define
the relationship between religion and state in Italian is laicità.13 This Article
will deal with this concept extensively, mostly because there is no agreement
in Italy around the concept itself and its legal implications.14 The disagreement
is so striking that both those who endorse and those who oppose the public
display of religious symbols refer to the principle of laicità.15
Precisely because of the difficulties in defining the relationship between
church and state, the Author deliberately uses the Italian word laicità wherever
the Italian courts and scholars do so in addressing such a relationship. The
Author prefers not to translate the word because its meaning and implications
are exactly what are at issue now, and any translation might be misleading.
Rather, the Author tries to describe its meaning with the aid of the court
decisions that have contributed to its definition.
Until the ECHR’s decisions, the disagreement about laicità was mainly a
domestic issue in Italy.16 But following the first ECHR’s decision, there was
opposition between the majority of Italian society and the Court that shifted the
discussion into an international debate.17
This Article aims to highlight why and how opinions about the relationship
between church and state conflict within the Italian legal culture, as well as
between the Italian mainstream and the ECHR’s attitude in the first degree.
Moreover, this conflict does not just demonstrate that there are different
conceptions of the basic features of democratic and constitutional states, such
as religious liberty and the relationship between church and state, but it also

bin/brp/telestats.cgi?brp_ref=074000341&brp_file=0000.pdf. For a discussion on an example from Quebec,
see G. BOUCHARD & C. TAYLOR, CONSULTATION COMM’N ON ACCOMMODATION PRACTICES RELATED TO
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, BUILDING THE FUTURE: A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION 80–84 (2008), http://www.
accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-abrege-en.pdf.
13 Giulio Ercolessi, Italy: The Contemporary Condition of Italian Laicità, in SECULARISM, WOMEN &
THE STATE: THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9, 9–11 (Barry Kosmin & Ariela Keysar
eds., 2009).
14 See id. at 11.
15 See id.
16 The internal debate paid little or no attention to international treaties and focused on the interpretation
of Italian constitutional provisions regarding the right to religious freedom. See, e.g., Francesco Finocchiaro,
Alle Origini della Laicità Statale, 1 IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 1257, 1257 (2002); Francesco Finocchiaro, La
Repubblica Italiana Non È uno Stato Laico, 1 IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 11, 11 (1997); C. Mirabelli,
Prospettive del Principio di Laicità, 2 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 331, 331 (2001).
17 See Giuseppe D’Elia, Il Crocefisso nelle Aule Scolastiche: Un Paradosso Che Non Resiste all’Europa,
FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI, 1 (Nov. 2009), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/
stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0160_delia.pdf.
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illuminates the different opinions about what the role of religion should be in a
pluralistic society. Consequently, different viewpoints about the role of
religion in a pluralistic society lie beneath the surface of each court’s decisions.
The dominant Italian constitutional interpretation believes pluralism18 is
enriched by religious culture and thought in public institutions such as schools.
Though this opinion is debated—and was partially abandoned by the
Constitutional Court itself around fifteen years ago—it remains well embedded
in Italian constitutional, as well as legal, culture.19 On the contrary, the
ECHR’s first degree decision rationalized that adherence to Article 9
guarantees religious liberty by secularizing public institutions and life and
prohibiting any space for religious expression in the public sphere.20
Nevertheless, the conflict between these two different views of pluralism,
that of the prevailing Italian attitude and that of the ECHR’s in its first degree,
is largely due to the latter court’s expansive interpretation of its own role. The
ECHR first degree’s decision overstepped the boundaries of its function and
tried to supplant the Italian domestic debate about the relationship between
church and state within a pluralistic society with its own view, based on the
European Convention on Human Rights. In supplanting the domestic Italian
debate on religious pluralism, the ECHR relied on a highly debatable
interpretation of the religious freedom provision of the European Convention,
using a contentious interpretation of the right to religious freedom as protecting
religious minorities at the expense of the widely held view of the Catholic
majority.
The following decision restored, at least partially, the primary role of the
states in shaping their own proper models of relationship between church and
state. Even though the Grand Chamber did not openly criticize the wide
interpretation of the role of the ECHR, it trimmed the expansive action that
was taken in the first degree.
Part I of this Article analyzes the Italian judgments that led the applicant to
the ECHR as well as the ECHR’s decisions in Lautsi v. Italy. It shows how two
18 The Author refers to pluralism in a broad sense, defined as a public sphere in which different religious
and cultural identities coexist, according to the Italian Constitutional Court. Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n.
440, pt. 3.2, para. 4 (It.).
19 See Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 22–26.
20 A comparative approach can be found in Iain T. Benson, The Case for Religious Inclusivism and the
Judicial Recognition of Religious Associational Rights: A Response to Lenta, 1 CONST. CT. REV. 295, 295–310
(2008).
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interpretations of religious liberty, equality, and the relationship between
church and state have collided in the courts’ rationales. Part I also briefly
illuminates the intellectual backgrounds underlying the rationales of the Italian
courts and of the ECHR’s decisions. Part II analyzes the Italian constitutional
framework and the judicial decisions that have reflected upon religious
freedom and equality—decisions that played a prominent role in shaping the
principles of the Italian relationship between church and state. The analysis
highlights that the trend of the jurisprudence started with an unprecedented and
religion-friendly conception of laicità, and progressively moved toward a
strong separation between church and state, whose positions are quite akin to
the attitude that the ECHR kept in the first degree. Part III briefly considers the
cultural and juridical debate that lies beneath these court decisions and which
contributes such a crucial role to this topic. As we will see, the domestic debate
mostly addresses the prominent role of the Catholic Church and its influence
on Italian social and political culture.21 This debate is mainly concerned about
the influence of Catholicism on younger generations and about the role of
public education in shaping the mentality of citizens.22 This path will be
helpful to understand the disparity between the Italian courts’ and the ECHR’s
conceptions of religious pluralism. The Conclusion reflects on the status of the
ongoing debate about religious liberty and relationship between church and
state in light of the ECHR’s decisions, on the efforts of the Court to push the
Italian debate towards the French cliché of separation between religion and
state, and on the effects that the Court’s decision has on Italians’ attitude
towards the Court itself. In the Conclusion, the Author argues that the ECHR
has at least initially misunderstood the role of the European Convention on
Human Rights and undermined the survival of the constitutional traditions of
the member states.
I. THE CRUCIFIX AT SCHOOL: FROM ITALY TO STRASBOURG
A. The Decision of the Administrative Tribunal and the Appendix Before the
Council of State
The crucifix case started near Padua, Italy.23 Soile Lautsi, a Finnish mother
of two children who attended a public school in the town of Abano Terme,
appeared before the Administrative Tribunal of the Veneto Region and
21
22
23

See infra text accompanying notes 271–80.
See infra text accompanying notes 276, 299, 302–04.
Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 6.
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petitioned for the removal of the Catholic symbol from the public school.24 She
argued that the presence of the crucifix in the school violated the principle of
laicità, which, according to Italian constitutional jurisprudence, is embedded in
the Italian Constitution.25 She requested that the Administrative Tribunal
recognize the illegitimacy of the symbol and order its removal.26
In its decision, the Administrative Tribunal endorsed the constitutional
principle of laicità, but rejected the request.27 The court reasoned that laicità
does not forbid any public display of religious symbols, nor do these symbols
violate the freedom of religion or the freedom of conscience of these students
or their mother.28 Conversely, the Tribunal clearly affirmed that the display of
the cross is not only fully consistent with, but is even justified and rooted in the
principle of laicità.29
The Tribunal’s decision was the antithesis of the judgment that Italian legal
scholars had expected. At the time of the decision, public opinion, as well as
scholarly opinion on the constitutionality of the symbol’s presence in school,
was sharply divided.30 Those who endorsed the presence of the crucifix
maintained that it should remain in schools because of its cultural meaning.31
They argued that even if its presence was not dictated by the Constitution, it
could be displayed because it had both religious and cultural value.32 It gave

24

Id. para. 10. The crucifixes in question in the public schools were mandated by administrative
provisions of the 1920s. See Decreto 20 aprile 1924, n. 965 art. 118 (It.); Decreto 26 aprile 1928, n. 1297 art.
119 (It.).
25 Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 9.
26 The Tribunal suspended the judgment and raised the case before the Constitutional Court (the order
was released on January 14, 2004) and requested that it judge whether such a religious sign was consistent
with the constitutional principle of laicità. Id. para. 11. In deciding judgment Number 389 (delivered in 2004),
the Constitutional Court dismissed the case without judging the constitutional issue. Id. para. 12. Instead, the
court simply declared itself incompetent to make this decision because, according to the Italian Constitution,
the Constitutional Court only has the power to review the constitutionality of provisions that are contained in
statutory laws (specifically, Article 134 of the Italian Constitution), while the provision concerning the display
of the crucifix is not contained in the Italian law. Id. paras. 10, 12, 26.
27 Id. para. 13.
28 Id. para. 11.
29 Id.
30 Susanna Mancini, The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the CounterMajoritarian Difficulty, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 6 (2010).
31 See, e.g., Stefano Ceccanti, E se la Corte andasse in Baviera?, in LA LAICITÀ CROCIFISSA? IL NODO
COSTITUZIONALE DEI SIMBOLI RELIGIOSI NEI LUOGHI PUBBLICI 1, 10 (Roberto Bin, Giuditta Brunelli, Andrea
Pugiotto & Paolo Veronesi eds., 2004) (“Se non si accetta l’univocità di significati del simbolo non c’è infatti
puntuale contrasto [of the crucifix] rispetto ai principi della Costituzione.”).
32 TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3, 366 (It.).
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public witness to the cultural roots of Italy, which were principally Christian.33
Conversely, those who opposed the display of the crucifix argued that one
could not separate the religious value from its cultural significance—the
cultural debts of Italy to Christianity were not to be questioned. However, the
display of the cross was impossible because it kept its religious meaning, thus
violating the constitutional principles of laicità—equality among citizens and
religious impartiality of the public administration.34
At the beginning of its decision, the Administrative Tribunal seemed to
endorse the second opinion. The decision affirmed that the crucifix retains its
religious significance even if it is displayed in public: “The crucifix cannot,
today, be considered as a mere historical and cultural symbol, neither in the
scholastic environment, but it must be evaluated as a religious symbol, too.”35
But the court drew a strikingly different conclusion from this premise
compared to what opponents had claimed, and therefore gave quite a surprising
argument for upholding the crucifix display. According to the Tribunal, the
presence of the crucifix is consistent with the principle of laicità precisely
because of its religious meaning.36 If one considers Christian thought and even
some elements of Catholic doctrine, the court reasoned, one can conclude that
the principle of laicità is implied in, and even produced by, the Catholic
religion.37 The very constitutional principle of laicità depends on Christianity
and its religious symbols, like the crucifix.38 Thus, the idea of eliminating the
crucifix because it violates laicità is unreasonable because it would be
tantamount to eliminating the very symbol of laicità.39
These considerations led the court to delve deeply into the realm of
Christian thought. Its lengthy opinion was unrestrained in extensively sifting
through the contents and richness of Christian theology.40 Starting with
33

Id. at 361.
See Alessandro Morelli, Crocifissi o Croci? Ancora Qualche Osservazione su Icone, “Simboli di
Stato” e Uso Politico dei Segni Religiosi, FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI, pt. 4, para. 10 (Nov. 2003),
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=content&task=view&id=699.
35 TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3, 362 (It.). The translations of the
Italian and of the ECHR’s decisions are provided by the Author of this Article.
36 Id. at 366.
37 Id. at 363.
38 Id. at 366.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 360–66; see Paulo Cavana, La Questione del Crocifisso in Italia, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE
LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE, 7 (May 2004), http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/documents/Cavana_
questionedelcrocifisso.pdf.
34
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Christ’s famous principle “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to
God the things that are God’s,”41 the judge effectively gave birth to a huge new
Weltanschauung.42 Moreover, in doing so, the court painted quite a biased
portrait of Christian history.43 It dismissed the crusades, the inquisition, and
many other painful episodes in Christian history as merely historical mistakes,
because in the Christian creed: “[N]otwithstanding the Inquisition,
Antisemitism, and the crusades, one can easily find the principle of human
dignity, tolerance, and freedom—including religious freedom—that are part of
the same fabric of the State’s laicità.”44
Due to the court’s commitment to investigating the Christian doctrine, the
judgment is debatable. The decision overstepped the boundaries of the state
judge, addressed directly the very core of the Catholic truths, and even
underestimated some painful episodes of the past.45
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the court’s rationale deserves some
attention because it took a quite interesting path: it upheld the display of the
crucifix because of its historical connection with the principle of laicità.46
After the Administrative Tribunal’s judgment, the case was appealed to the
Council of State.47 In a more succinct decision the Council joined the opinion
of the first Tribunal and upheld the judgment.48 Though it demonstrated more
equilibrium, moderation, and self-restraint than the Tribunal below, the
Council essentially endorsed the judgment that the crucifix can be displayed
because it is consistent with the democratic nature of the Italian state.49 The
41 TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3, 363 (It.). The translation is
provided by the Author of this Article.
42 “Weltanschauung” means “world view” in German. Weltanschauung, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weltanschauung (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). See Nicola Fiorita, Se il
Crocefisso Afferma e Conferma la Laicità dello Stato: Paradossi, Incongruenze e Sconfinamenti di una
Sentenza del Tar del Veneto, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE, 1 (Dec. 2004),
http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/documents/Fiorita_Crocefisso.pdf.
43 TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3, 365 (It.).
44 Id. The translation is provided by the Author of this Article.
45 See Fiorita, supra note 42, at 5–7.
46 Luca P. Vanoni, Il Crocifisso Come Simbolo della Laicità dello Stato (Commento a Tar Veneto,
Sezione III, Sentenza 17 Marzo 2005, n.1110), FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI, para. 5 (Apr. 2005),
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=354&Itemid=91.
47 The Council of State has basically two functions. The first is that it is the second degree court that
judges the legitimacy of non-legislative acts. 2 MANUALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 278 (G. De Vergottini, Gli
Organi Ausiliari, G. Amato & A. Barbera eds., 1997). Second, it gives opinions to the government about the
legitimacy of the non-legislative acts. Id.
48 Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, pt. DIRITTO, pt. 3 (It.).
49 Id. paras. 16–17.
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Council affirmed that the crucifix embodies “the values of tolerance, reciprocal
respect, inner importance of all human beings, human rights, liberty, autonomy
of moral conscience before any authority, human solidarity, rejection of any
discrimination, which characterize the Italian civilization.”50
Even though the Administrative Tribunal and the Council of State
maintained a highly debatable line of reasoning, one must recognize that they
did not simply accomplish the goal of preserving the Catholic tradition in the
public square. Actually, they went further—they did not restrain from
considering the religious realm, but resolved to consider the internal religious
meaning of the symbol.51 They dealt with the meaning of the cross from the
inside of the tradition, rather than from an outside viewpoint.52 The inner
Catholic tradition was thus scrutinized. It is an interesting approach since it
does not see any divide between the legal vantage point and the religious one.
The two are so close to each other that courts can delve into the religious realm
in order to decide cases that are related to religion. This approach has its
dangers since it is not clear at all to what extent the judge can move into the
religious realm, nor does it address the fact that he lacks the power and the
necessary skills to reflect on such subjects.
Thus, the Administrative Tribunal and the Council of State addressed the
topic of the public display of religious symbols from a unique point of view.
They both affirmed that it is not only consistent with the principle of laicità but
even represents the very origin of the principle itself.53 According to the
wording of the Tribunal as well as of the Council, a pluralistic society demands
the open relationship between religion and the state.54 This is especially true
for the majoritarian Italian religion, Catholicism, and more broadly for
Christianity. In fact, Christian doctrine provided the main contribution to the
building of the principle of laicità.55

50
51
52

Id. at 10. The translation is provided by the Author of this Article.
Vanoni, supra note 46, para. 6.
Silvio Ferrari has theorized this attitude. SILVIO FERRARI, LO SPIRITO

DEI

DIRITTI RELIGIOSI 282

(2002).
53
54

See Cons. Stato, sez. sesta, 13 gennaio 2006, n. 556, para. 6 (It.).
See id.; see also ANDREA PIN, LAICITÀ E ISLAM IN ITALIA: UNA QUESTIONE

(2010).
55

1 SANDRO GHERRO, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO I 162 (2d ed. 2009).
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B. The First Degree Decision of the European Court of Human Rights
After losing in the Italian Courts, Lautsi appealed to the ECHR,56 which
was established to provide a forum for the adjudication of the rights that are
contemplated in the European Convention on Human Rights.57 Therefore, the
Finnish mother petitioned the Court to consider if the presence of the crucifix
in Italian public schools was consistent with Article 9 of the European
Convention.58
The ECHR found that the crucifix displayed in a public school violates the
right to freedom of religion protected in Article 9: “Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.”59According to the Court, the crucifix
display violated Article 9 for two reasons. The first was that the crucifix
infringed the mother’s right to provide her children with the religious and
spiritual education she believes in.60 This right, the Court concluded, is granted
by the first additional Protocol of the Convention: “‘No person shall be denied
the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in
relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents
to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious
and philosophical convictions.’”61
After reciting the long history of the display of the crucifix in Italian
schools,62 the ECHR concluded that the display of such a symbol would harm
the right of parents to educate their children and violate the latter’s
conscience.63 The educational value of the crucifix, the Court concluded, was
particularly problematic because it is a religious symbol that the Italian
majority endorses and that is displayed to all students, including those who do
56

Lautsi I, supra note 1.
“To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the
Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Court.’ It shall function on a permanent basis.” European Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 6, art. 19.
58 Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 27.
59 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 9.
60 Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 57–58.
61 Id. para. 27.
62 See id. paras. 16–20. Lately, the Ministry of Education has recommended directors of public schools to
display the crucifix in every classroom. Direttiva 3 ottobre 2007, n. 2666 (It.).
63 See Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 57.
57
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not share that faith.64 It did not matter that the crucifix has cultural meaning
because its prevailing meaning is religious.65 It had to be removed from
classrooms precisely because of its religious meaning.66
In the Court’s opinion, it was not only irrelevant that the majority of
students and teachers endorse its religious or cultural meaning, but the need for
its removal was even aggravated by the fact that the majority of Italians have a
Christian creed or share the Catholic culture.67 The Court maintained that the
protection of fundamental rights is more important when a social majority
exists than when it does not.68
The presence of the crucifix may easily be interpreted by pupils of all
ages as a religious sign, and they will feel that they have been
brought up in a school environment marked by a particular religion.
What may be encouraging for some religious pupils may be
emotionally disturbing for pupils of other religions or those who
profess no religion. That risk is particularly strong among pupils
belonging to religious minorities. Negative freedom of religion is not
69
restricted to the absence of religious services or religious education.

A second reason for declaring the illegitimacy of the crucifix display,
according to the Court, was that the display of the crucifix also violated the
right to freedom of religion because it touched upon the relationship between
religion and state.70 The Court here used the principle of strict separation
between church and state to justify its reasoning.71 Even though the Court did
not explicitly use this expression, it certainly endorsed the concept by its
repeated reference to the use of the concept of a religiously neutral state.72 The
European constitutional environment tends to use the idea of “neutrality,” as
derived from the French legal culture,73 in order to express the necessity that
the state does not endorse or obstruct any religious belief, but also keeps an

64

Id. para. 55.
See id. para. 51.
66 Id. para. 55.
67 Id. para. 50.
68 Id.
69 Id. para. 55.
70 Id. para. 47(e).
71 See id. para. 57.
72 Id.
73 See Paolo Cavana, Modelli e Significati di Laicità nelle Società Pluraliste, EDITRICE ELLEDICI, pt. 3
(Apr. 2005), http://www.elledici.org/scuola/formazione/dwl/relazione_cavana_19apr05.pdf.
65
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appropriate distance from the religious realm.74 The Court repeatedly insisted
that the principle of state neutrality toward religion is the most important tool
for granting real freedom of belief and conscience for all: “The State has a duty
to uphold confessional neutrality in public education, where school attendance
is compulsory regardless of religion, and which must seek to inculcate in
pupils the habit of critical thought.”75 Or, again, the Court stated that the state
has a “duty to respect neutrality in the exercise of public authority, particularly
in the field of education.”76
But the Court used the principle of “neutrality” in its strongest form when it
discussed the necessity of protecting a shared educational environment where a
plurality of beliefs and culture coexist, such as in public schools. The Court
clearly distinguished between what is permitted in civil society and the
activities and the initiatives that are allowed in public schools:
Respect for parents’ convictions must be possible in the context of
education capable of ensuring an open school environment which
encourages inclusion rather than exclusion, regardless of the pupils’
social background, religious beliefs or ethnic origins. Schools should
not be the arena for missionary activities or preaching; they should be
a meeting place for different religions and philosophical convictions,
in which pupils can acquire knowledge about their respective
77
thoughts and traditions.

The presence of the crucifix in public schools, the Court concluded, is
clearly inconsistent with the neutrality principle and violates the Convention.78
Ultimately, the ECHR’s decision did not ban religion from public
schools.79 On the contrary, it implicitly admitted that religious beliefs can be
74 For a discussion of ECHR decisions that have progressively shaped the idea of “neutrality,” see
Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (regarding the field of education); Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001-V
Eur. Ct. H.R.; Folgerø v. Norway, 2007-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.
75 Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 56 (“L’Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de
l’éducation publique où la présence aux cours est requise sans considération de religion et qui doit chercher à
inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.”).
76 Id. para. 57 (“Le devoir incombant à l’Etat de respecter la neutralité dans l’exercice de la fonction
publique, en particulier dans le domaine de l’éducation.”).
77 Id. para. 47(c) (“Le respect des convictions des parents doit être possible dans le cadre d’une éducation
capable d’assurer un environnement scolaire ouvert et favorisant l’inclusion plutôt que l’exclusion,
indépendamment de l’origine sociale des élèves, des croyances religieuses ou de l’origine ethnique. L’école ne
devrait pas être le théâtre d’activités missionnaires ou de prêche; elle devrait être un lieu de rencontre de
différentes religions et convictions philosophiques, où les élèves peuvent acquérir des connaissances sur leurs
pensées et traditions respectives.”).
78 Id. paras. 57–58.
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discussed and exchanged by individuals.80 However, in order to guarantee the
environment for such exchange, the Court reasoned, the school must adopt a
position of religious neutrality, because it is the only position that protects the
minority from the attitude of the majority.81
The Court ordered Italy to indemnify the applicant.82 The Italian
government appealed to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR,83 which recently
delivered its final judgment.84
C. The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights’s Grand Chamber
The Grand Chamber reversed the decision that was given in the first
degree, holding that the display of the crucifix in Italian public schools does
not infringe upon the right to education as provided in Article 2 of Protocol
Number 1,85 nor does it violate Article 9’s freedom of religion.86 The Grand
Chamber aligned itself to the first degree’s decision in maintaining that the
state has a “‘duty of neutrality and impartiality,’”87 but that the Italian state did
not violate such duty. The Chamber estimated that (1) the display of the
crucifix was an “essentially passive symbol” with an influence on pupils not
“comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities”;88
that (2) its presence “is not associated with compulsory teaching about
Christianity”;89 and, finally, that (3) the Finnish mother of the two students
“retained in full her right as a parent to enlighten and advise her children, to
exercise in their regard her natural functions as educator and to guide them on
a path in line with her philosophical convictions.”90

79

See id. para. 57.
See id.
81 See id. para. 55.
82 Id. para. 67. It amounted to €5000. Id.
83 Respondent State Act of Appeal, Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/
news/documents/2656_lautsi_ricorso_italia.pdf.
84 Lautsi II, supra note 1.
85 See id. para. 77.
86 Id.
87 Id. para. 60.
88 Id. para. 72.
89 Id. para. 74.
90 Id. para. 75.
80
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All things considered, the Grand Chamber upheld the duty of neutrality of
the state,91 especially in the field of education,92 but decided that the display of
the crucifix did not amount to a violation of neutrality.
II. THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION: THE FRAMERS AND THE LONG ROAD TO
EQUALITY
The principle of neutrality in church-state relations is quite a recent
development in Italian jurisprudence.93 Nevertheless, the neutrality principle is
not plainly consistent with the Italian constitutional culture and with the
Constitutional Court’s landmark decisions on religious liberty.94 The history
regarding the framing of the Italian Constitution and its progressive enactment
in the field of religious freedom demonstrates this conflict in Italian
jurisprudence.
The aim of this Part is to place precisely the case of the crucifix in its
constitutional and historical context in Italy, thus demonstrating how Italian
constitutional law has considered religious freedom and equality, and the
cultural links that tie it back to Catholic teachings.
Shortly after the end of World War II, Italy went through an extensive
process of nation building.95 The cornerstone was the Constitutional Assembly
that was founded in 1946 to give the new Italian Republic a written
constitution, which could be amended only through the rules that the
Constitution itself provides.96
At the Constitutional Assembly, the primary participants were parties such
as the Democratic Christian Party—which had strong links with the Holy
See—and the Communist Party.97 Both of them had previously fought to
liberate Italy from fascism.98
91

Id. para. 60.
Id. para. 72.
93 See Mark Donovan, The Italian State: No Longer Catholic, No Longer Christian, W. EUR. POL. (Jan.
1, 2003), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-100727750.html.
94 See Stefano Sicardi, Questioni Aperte nella Disciplina del Fenomeno Religioso: Dalla Laicità al
Sistema delle Fonti, 1 QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 4, 9 (2005).
95 See generally LIVIO PALADIN, PER UNA STORIA COSTITUZIONALE DELL’ITALIA REPUBBLICANA (2004)
(describing the period from 1945 to 1948).
96 Art. 138 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
97 See Richard M. Locke, The Demise of the National Union in Italy, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 229,
231 (1992). While the latter was led by the prominent figure of Palmiro Togliatti, who took part in the
Assembly, the Christian Party was headed by Alcide De Gasperi, who at the time was also the leader of the
92
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Notwithstanding the collaboration between the Communists and the
Christian Democrats at the end of Italy’s fascist regime, their ideological
differences persisted and therefore, their paradigmatic struggles repeatedly led
to conflict at the Constitutional Assembly.99
However, there was little or no debate amongst the framers concerning
religious liberty articles in the Constitution.100 Moreover, the idea of religious
freedom or, at least, religious tolerance, was a quite well-rooted value in Italian
history.101
No group wanted religious freedom to be heavily restricted by the new
Republican Constitution.102 Even Catholic members of the Constitutional
Assembly, as well as the Papacy, believed that religious freedom should be
clearly affirmed.103
The Constitution still contains the four articles concerning religious liberty
that were drafted by the Constitutional Assembly in the form that they had at
the time the constitutional text was approved.104 Three of them—Articles 8, 19,
and 20—were easily drafted and approved with little or no dispute by the
Assembly.105

government. See Giovanni Sale, Between Republic and Constituent Assembly, 5 30DAYS IN THE CHURCH AND
IN THE WORLD 49, 49–56 (2006).
98 See Locke, supra note 97, at 231.
99 Sale, supra note 97.
100 The fascist period, which included the alliance with Nazi Germany and the so-called racial laws
enacted in Italy in 1938, and which ended with the discovery of the death camps in Eastern Europe, was such a
frightening experience that a strong affirmation of religious liberty was not at issue. See Ethan J. Hollander,
Italian Fascism and the Jews: Brown? Or Shades of Gray? (2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://weber.ucsd.
edu/~ejhollan/Haaretz%20-%20Ital%20fascism%20-%20English.PDF.
101 See, e.g., FRANCESCO FINOCCHIARO, DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 102 (2003).
102 See Ercolessi, supra note 13, at 12–13.
103 See id. The modern Italian state that arose in the nineteenth century was less pro-Catholic than it
appeared. The Italian Kingdom was formally Catholic, according to the Albertin Statute (1848) and the
Lateran Pacts (1929), and these laws undoubtedly privileged Catholics. Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 21–22.
However, the Roman Catholic Church suffered from anti-clericalism during that same period: the political
confrontation between the enlarging Italian Kingdom and the state of the Church led to some heavy measures
against Catholics. See Dean Swift, Anticlericalism, GEN. HIST., http://general-history.com/anticlericalism
(last visited Mar. 25, 2011). While traditional Catholic privileges waned, however, the political struggle
against the Catholic Church did not give birth to true ideological hostility, neither towards the church nor
towards religion in general. See EDOARDO TORTAROLO, IL LAICISMO 50 (1998).
104 See arts. 7, 8, 19, 20 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
105 See Maria Elisabetta de Franciscis, Constitutional Revisions in Italy, the Amending Process, in ITALY
IN TRANSITION: THE LONG ROAD FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND REPUBLIC 43, 43–83 (Paolo Jannie ed.,
1998).
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It is best to begin with Article 19, which contains the open affirmation of
religious liberty, then move to Article 8, which deals with treatment of
religious communities, and finally focus on the most debated Article 7.106 The
latter deserves a thorough analysis because it is the basis on which the
relationship between church and state has been constructed in the decades
since the Constitution was enacted.
Both Article 19 and Article 8 can be discussed briefly. Article 19 reads:
“Everyone is entitled to freely profess religious beliefs in any form,
individually or with others, to promote them, and to celebrate rites in public or
in private, provided they are not offensive to public morality.”107 This article
provides religious freedom for all—for minorities as well as the Catholic
majority.108
Article 8 addresses the Italian state’s recognition and treatment of religions
other than Catholicism.109 After affirming that all religions are equally free and
can organize themselves according to their own internal rules, it outlines the
relationship between non-Catholic religious groups and the state:
[1] Religious denominations are equally free before the law. [2]
Denominations other than Catholicism have the right to organize
themselves according to their own by-laws, provided they do not
conflict with the Italian legal system. [3] Their relationship with the
state is regulated by law, based on agreements with their
110
representatives.

Taken together, Articles 19 and 8 establish a broad recognition of religious
freedom in terms of belief and exercise, regardless of personal choices in
matter of faith.
A. The Shaping of Article 7: The Origins of Italian Laicità
While the previous two articles created little or no debate,111 the same is not
true for Article 7, which focuses on the status of the Catholic Church and its
106 Article 20 deserves no attention because it provides that religious communities and associations may
not discriminate with respect to non-religious ones: “For associations or institutions, their religious character
or religious or confessional aims do not justify special limitations or fiscal burdens regarding their
establishment, legal capacity, or activities.” Art. 20 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
107 Id. art. 19.
108 Id.
109 Id. art. 8.
110 Id.
111 For the Vatican diplomatic documents, see GIOVANNI SALE, IL VATICANO E LA COSTITUZIONE (2008).
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relationship with the Italian state.112 As the first article on religion, it had to
accurately define the relationship between church and state, and it is the
constitutional provision that has played the most relevant and important role in
shaping the Italian version of the principle of laicità.113 The final and current
form of Article 7 is as follows: “[1] The State and the Catholic Church are,
each within their own reign, independent and sovereign. [2] Their relationship
is regulated by the Lateran pacts. Amendments to these pacts which are
accepted by both parties do not require the procedure of constitutional
amendments.”114
The second sentence was hotly debated at the Constitutional Assembly.115
The Catholic Church and the Christian members of the Constitutional
Assembly insisted on the need to mention the Lateran pacts.116 In 1929, the
Vatican and the Italian Government signed these pacts, which accorded the
Holy See independence from Italy and recognized it as a sovereign state.117
The Vatican and Catholic Assembly members wanted reassurance that the
pacts, which reaffirmed the confessional principle of Italy as a Catholic
nation,118 were not overcome by the principle of equality before the law that
was affirmed by Article 3 of the Constitution.119 Due to the broad freedom and
the privileges that the pacts accorded to the Catholic Church, the Catholic
hierarchy feared the Constitutional Court could find that the Pacts conflicted
with Constitutional provisions mandating religious equality in accordance with
Article 3;120 therefore, the Constitutional Court could outlaw the Italian law
enforcing the pacts.121 If the Constitution had remained silent about the pacts,
the Catholic hierarchy affirmed, the equilibrium between the traditional

112

Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
See Ercolessi, supra note 13, at 9.
114 Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
115 See SALE, supra note 111, at 73.
116 See id. at 73–75.
117 Tratto fra la Santa Sede e L’Italia, VATICAN: HOLY SEE, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_19290211_patti-lateranensi_it.html#TRATTATO_FRA_LA_
SANTA_SEDE_E_L%E2%80%99ITALIA (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
118 Article 1 of the Treaty between the Holy See and the Italian State provided: “L’Italia riconosce e
riafferma il principio consacrato nell’art. 1 dello Statuto del Regno 4 marzo 1848, pel quale la religione
cattolica, apostolica e romana è la sola religione dello Stato.” Id. The Treaty was enforced by Italian Law No.
810 of 1929. Legge 27 maggio 1929 n. 810 (It.).
119 Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
120 Id. “All citizens have equal social status and are equal before the law, without regard to their sex, race,
language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social conditions.” Id.
121 SALE, supra note 111, at 78–86.
113
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Catholic majority and the minority could be broken; therefore, the Church
pushed for an explicit inclusion of the pacts within the final text.122
Conversely, leftist parties, including the Communist Party, did not want to
mention the pacts because this would allude to the pre-Republic established
church regime.123 The discussion was deadlocked until Palmiro Togliatti, the
leader of the Communists, decided to vote for the explicit inclusion of the
Lateran pacts in Article 7.124 In fact, the Christian Democratic Party as well as
the Papacy wanted an explicit mention of the pacts.125 Due to the insistence of
the Vatican, the otherwise egalitarian Italian Constitution now referenced the
Lateran pacts that gave special privileges to Catholicism.126 This contradiction
provoked much controversy,127 which eventually resulted in the modification
of the Pacts in 1984.128
Scholars focusing on the principle of laicità have unanimously recognized
the importance of the historical roots and the text of the first section of Article
7.129 The reference to the two powers as independent and sovereign, each
within its own realm, seems to testify to the existence of a distinction between
the political and the religious orders. It is obviously excessive to conclude that
this idea of “distinction” fully shaped the idea of laicità, but this expression
indicates that there is a separation between the two realms of church and state,
even though it does not clarify if there is a complete separation between the
two or if they are simply to be considered as distinct from each other.
The origins of Article 7 come from Catholic social doctrine. Leo XIII’s
encyclical letter Immortale Dei130 explicitly inspired many of the
122 For a discussion of the history of the relationship between the Vatican, the Jesuits, and the Catholic
framers at the time of the shaping of the Article, see id.
123 Id. at 73–86.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 87–95.
126 Id. at 96–100.
127 The mention of the Lateran pacts inspired scholarly debate about the religious assessment of the Italian
state. See, e.g., SERGIO LARICCIA, COSCIENZA E LIBERTÀ: PROFILI COSTITUZIONALI DEL DIRITTO
ECCLESIASTICO ITALIANO 58, 167 (1989); Finocchiaro, La Repubblica Italiana non è uno Stato Laico, supra
note 16, at 11.
128 Marco Ventura, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion in Italy, 19
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 913, 925 (2005).
129 See LARICCIA, supra note 127, at 37–43; Tiziano Rimoldi, I Rapporti Stato-Chiesa nell’Europa dei
Quindici, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE, 1 (Jan. 2005), http://www.olir.it/
areetematiche/83/documents/Rimoldi_Europa.pdf.
130 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Immortale Dei (Nov. 1, 1885), available at http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei_en.html. Framers Dossetti

PIN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:46 AM

THE ITALIAN SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

115

Constitutional Framers. Members of the Constitutional Assembly repeatedly
quoted Immortale Dei, and the Constitution clearly echoes its expression:
The Almighty, therefore, has given the charge of the human race to
two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over
divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme,
each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are
defined by the nature and special object of the province of each, so
that there is, we may say, an orbit traced out within which the action
of each is brought into play by its own native right. But, inasmuch as
each of these two powers has authority over the same subjects, and as
it might come to pass that one and the same thing-related differently,
but still remaining one and the same thing-might belong to the
jurisdiction and determination of both, therefore God, who foresees
all things, and who is the author of these two powers, has marked out
131
the course of each in right correlation to the other.

The quotation of “supreme” powers endowed with “native right(s)” is quite
similar to Article 7’s conception of church and state as “independent” and
“sovereign”; moreover, the reference to two orbits is close to the idea of two
reigns or regimes.132 This understanding of the relationship of church and state
is so relevant and apparent that it is said that the Vatican II Council reaffirmed
Immortale Dei’s ideas.133
Article 7’s drafting history excludes the hypothesis that the Framers
envisioned a strict form of separation between church and state. First, the
framers explicitly recognized collaboration between church and state, both in
Article 7 for the relationship with the Catholic Church134 and in Article 8 for
and Riccio explicitly quoted the encyclical letter several times during the drafting of the Constitution.
Constitutional Assembly Act, No. 421 (Nov. 21, 1946) (statement of Dossetti); Constitutional Assembly Act,
No. 2057 (Mar. 13, 1947) (statement of Riccio while speaking about Canon Law’s original character) (“[È]
ormai pacifico, e non solo negli scrittori cattolici, in quanto non è stato affermato soltanto da Leone XIII,
soprattutto nella Immortale Dei, ma anche in altri scrittori cattolici e non cattolici, tra cui Santi Romano
(L’ordinamento giuridico, Sansoni, 1946), Gismondi (Il nuovo giurisdizionalismo italiano, Milano, Giuffré,
1946), De Luca (Considerazioni sull’autonomia e la pubblicità della Chiesa nel diritto italiano, Giuffré,
1946).”).
131 Leo XIII, supra note 130, para. 13. The encyclical letter endorses the legitimacy of the state law with a
reference to St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Romans 13:1 (World English Bible) (“Let every soul be in
subjection to the higher authorities, for there is no authority except from God, and those who exist are ordained
by God.”).
132 Compare Leo XIII, supra note 130, para. 13, with art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
133 Paul VI, Apostolic Constitution, Gaudium et Spes no. 76 (Dec. 7, 1965).
134 Art. 7 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Their relationship [between the state and the Catholic Church] is
regulated by the Lateran pacts. Amendments to these pacts which are accepted by both parties do not require
the procedure of constitutional amendments.”).
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the relationships with other religions.135 Second, the Catholic tradition, which
led to a paraphrasing of the encyclical letter in Article 7, shows the strong link
between the secular and religious spheres in the Italian Constitution. Therefore,
the constitutional framers did not regard the two realms as completely separate,
and the Catholic Church at the time did not encourage such a separation in
theological or practical terms.136 Moreover, some Framers explicitly rejected
the principle of laicità because it sounded hostile to religion due to its French
pedigree.137
However, the framers clearly refused to include the Catholic religious
heritage of Italy within the constitutional text. A state-established church
regime was not a realistic option, although some members of the Assembly
proposed mentioning Catholicism in the text as the main Italian religious
denomination, and others went further, suggesting inserting a preamble
containing an Invocatio Dei before the constitutional articles.138 However, even
these proponents withdrew these suggestions when they saw the large
Assembly’s opposition to their proposal.139
Thus, the final provisions of the constitutional articles concerning religious
freedom contain traces of Catholic legacy, as well as the option for the state’s
collaboration with all religions and a specific relationship with the Catholic
denomination.140 From this interpretation, the Framers’ affirmation of religious
freedom for all was clear, while there was no endorsement of any strong
separation between the religious realm and the state.141 On the contrary, the

135 Id. art. 8 (“Their relationship with the state is regulated by law, based on agreements with their
representatives.”).
136 At that time, the most authoritative scholar on the relationship between church and state was probably
Francesco Ruffini, author of two widely known books on the subject. See generally FRANCESCO RUFFINI, LA
LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA: STORIA DELL’IDEA (1901); FRANCESCO RUFFINI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA COME DIRITTO
PUBBLICO SOGGETTIVO (1924).
137 See generally Stefano Ceccanti, La Laicità Francese Non È più Quella del Passato, FORUM DI
QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI (Dec. 2001), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=521&Itemid=.; Constitutional Assembly Act, No. 418 (Nov. 21, 1946)
(statement of Framer Mr. Cevolotto) (affirming the Constitutional draft) (“Di proposito non parla di Stato
laico, potendosi a questa definizione dare, per ragioni quasi storiche, un significato di anticlericalismo, al quale
si dichiara invece assolutamente contrario.”).
138 For records of such discussion, see Fabrizio Calzaretti, La Nascita della Costituzione: Le Discussioni
in Assemblea Costituente a Commento degli Articoli della Costituzione, NASCITACOSTITUZIONE.COM,
http://www.nascitacostituzione.it/costituzione.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); La Votazione Finale della
Costituzione, NASCITACOSTITUZIONE.COM, www.nascitacostituzione.it/finale.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2011).
139 See Ceccanti, supra note 137, para. 10.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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Constitution gave room for the pre-existing Lateran pacts as well as for
negotiating new agreements with other denominations.142
At the same time, sufficient ambiguity existed to give rise to a long-term
debate on the special position of the Catholic Church, the role of the Lateran
pacts that contained the confessional principle, and the principle of equality,
which the Italian Constitution affirms in several articles.143 It remained to be
determined if the traditional idea of a Catholic confessional regime was
eclipsed by the principle of equality, or, conversely, if the confessional
principle still ruled, because it was embedded in a treaty expressly mentioned
in the Constitution.144
B. The First Period of the Constitutional Religious Freedom Clauses from
1948 to 1984, and the Modifications of the Lateran Pacts
The constitutional jurisprudence concerning religious freedom developed
through what can be roughly divided into three different periods. The first
period saw a slow and gradual enforcement of the constitutional protection for
religious freedom and equality, allowing for mild discrimination against
religious minorities. The second period was characterized by the open
affirmation of the principle of laicità, which became the paradigm of the
following constitutional jurisprudence on religious freedom. The third period
saw the shift toward the paradigm of “neutrality,” which gave new features to
the principle of laicità.
The first developmental phase of constitutional jurisprudence began in
1948, when the Italian Constitution came into force;145 however, as
aforementioned, the principles of religious freedom and equality embedded in
Article 3 and in Article 8 were applied quite slowly and gradually.146 Given the
previous confessional (but tolerant) Italian legal environment, the
Constitutional Court, once it began operations in 1956,147 eliminated some
more obvious burdens on religious minorities, which were found to be clearly
142

See id.
See Michele Ainis, Laicità e Confessioni Religiose, RIVISTA DELL’ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI
COSTITUZIONALISTI, 1 (Oct. 2007), http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/convegni/
aic200710/ainis.pdf.
144 See Francesco Finocchiaro, Il Fenomeno Religioso, in MANUALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO III L’AZIONE
DEI PUBBLICI POTERI 295, 309–10 (Giuliano Amato & Augusto Barbera eds., 1997).
145 See Ercolessi, supra note 13, at 12–13.
146 See id.
147 See id.
143
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inconsistent with the new constitutional provisions, such as the necessity of
notifying public authorities when non-public religious events were held.148 But
milder forms of discrimination remained and appeared consistent with both the
enduring presence of the confessional principle identifying Italy as a Catholic
state as contemplated in the Lateran pacts, which the Constitution seemed to
endorse;149 and with the large following of Catholicism among Italians.150
An important change occurred in 1984 when the Lateran pacts were
modified. The modifications, which completely replaced the 1929
provisions,151 affirmed that the confessional principle was “no longer in
force.”152 This phrasing avoided clarifying whether the Catholic confessional
principle was now abrogated by the modifications of 1984, or whether it was
now deemed unconstitutional under the 1948 Constitution. In other words, the
modifications failed to dictate if the Italian Constitution trumped the Catholic
state model of the Lateran pacts.153 Even with this lingering uncertainty, the
modifications had clear and decisive effects on the status of religious
minorities’ rights to religious freedom and equality.154
After the modifications, an impressive shift occurred in the political and
jurisdictional activities concerning religious freedom.155 On the basis of Article
8, the Italian government negotiated agreements with several of the religious
minorities (the first agreement dates to 1984) and embarked on a serious
discussion over the need for a new religious freedom law.156 After reaching
agreements with six different religious denominations,157 which are signed and

148 See generally Corte Cost., 27 marzo 1985, n. 86 (It.); Corte Cost., 8 novembre 1984, n. 249 (It.); Corte
Cost., 11 gennaio 1974, n. 12 (It.); Corte Cost., 25 maggio 1963, n. 85 (It.); Corte Cost., 18 novembre 1958, n.
59 (It.); Corte Cost., 8 marzo 1957, n. 45 (It.).
149 One can see the evolution of the Constitutional jurisprudence through several Constitutional Court
decisions. See, e.g., Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.); Corte Cost., 28 luglio 1988, n. 925 (It.); Corte
Cost., 14 febbraio 1973, n. 14 (It.). The rationales of such decisions have given less importance to the
existence of a broad Catholic community in Italy and its historical role with the passing of time.
150 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 13 maggio 1965, n. 39 (It.) (identifying the Italian people’s religiosity with the
largely majoritarian Catholic Church).
151 See Ercolessi, supra note 13, at 13.
152 Additional Protocol art. 1 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
153 Finocchiaro, supra note 144, at 308–10.
154 See Valerio Tozzi, C’è Una Politica Ecclesiastica dei Governi. E la Dottrina?, STATO, CHIESE E
PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, 1 (Jan. 2007), http://www.statoechiese.it/images/stories/papers/200701/
tozzi_macerata.pdf.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 The Italian government reached agreements with the Valdeans, God’s Assemblies in Italy, the
Adventist Churches’ Union, Jewish Communities, the Baptist Union, and the Lutheran Union. Legge 11
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awaiting final approbation by the Parliament—and negotiating agreements
with six others158—it is evident that Article 8, which guarantees religious
freedom for all, has been widely applied. Due to the agreements, the state and
many denominations have agreed on a number of issues, such as holidays,
clergy, and the celebration of religious marriages.159 Yet for all these
piecemeal changes and agreements with specific religious groups, twenty-five
years of discussion have not resulted in a general law on religious freedom
providing general protection for religious activities.160
For now, the only applicable legislation is the 1929 Law on Permitted
Cults, which governs generally over religious minorities.161 The 1929
legislation remains in force except where abrogated.162 Its provisions include a
requirement that clergy of non-Catholic denominations be approbated by the
state (Article 3) and permission for such clergy to perform religious marriages,
which will be recognized as legally binding (Article 7).163
Italian protection of the right of religious freedom has gone through an
impressive evolution. A new pact with the Catholic Church was signed, many
religious minorities obtained special regulation for their own specific needs,
and the Constitutional Court trimmed some provisions that were affected by
the established state church model. Nevertheless, Italian laws governing
religious activities still need to be formally updated to reflect the more recent
Constitution.

agosto 1984, n. 449 (It.); Legge 22 novembre 1988, n. 517 (It.); Legge 22 novembre 1988, n. 516 (It.); Legge 8
marcia 1989, n. 101 (It.); Legge 12 aprile 1995, n. 116 (It.); Legge 29 novembre 1995, n. 520 (It.).
158 Agreements have been signed with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the Apostolic
Church in Italy, the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Italian Congregation, the Orthodox Archdioceses of Italy, the
Buddhists’ Union, and the Hindu Union. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, International
Religious Freedom Report 2010, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/
148946.htm.
159 For the texts of these agreements, see Le Intense con le Confessioni Religiose, GOVERNO ITALIANO,
http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
160 Stefano Ceccanti, Le Nuove Intese: Quando il Simbolico Conta Più dello Specifico, 2 QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI 399, 400 (2000).
161 Enti di Culto: Culto Ammessi, Legge 24 giugno 1929, n. 1159 (It.); see JOHN F. POLLARD, THE
VATICAN AND ITALIAN FASCISM, 1929–1932: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 65 (2005).
162 L. n. 1159/1929 (It.).
163 Law Number 1159 and related rules are clearly influenced by the fascist ideology that wanted religions
to be controlled. Nevertheless, they endowed religious minorities with certain important rights pertaining to
the worship of God and the religious education of children. See Regio Decreto 28 febbraio 1930, n. 289 (It.),
available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/servizi/come_fare/religioni/Enti_
di_culto_diversi_da_quello_cattolicox_riconoscimento_giuridico.html.

PIN GALLEYSFINAL

120

6/28/2011 9:46 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

C. The New Course of Italian Secularism: The Role of the Constitutional
Court
1. The First Approach to Laicità: The Debts to the Catholic Teachings
The Catholic roots of Italian constitutional culture are reflected in
constitutional jurisprudence after the modification of the Lateran pacts. The
pacts’ modification ended the first period of religious freedom jurisprudence
and commenced the second phase of enforcement of the constitutional
provisions concerning the right to religious freedom. The main result consisted
of shaping a brand new idea of laicità, which had minimal association with the
hostile French separation of church and state.
Shortly after modifying the 1929 Lateran pacts in 1984, the Constitutional
Court started applying the principles of equality before the law (according to
Article 3) and of religious freedom (according to Article 8) more liberally,
eliminating the forms of discrimination associated with the Lateran pacts.164
But its most significant holding was its open affirmation of the principle of
laicità. In 1989, the Constitutional Court’s Decision Number 203 explicitly
introduced the principle of laicità, by declaring that laicità represents one of
the essential elements of the Italian constitutional experiment.165 The Court
used and endorsed the very word that the constitutional framers had
deliberately avoided, explicitly incorporating it into Italian jurisprudence.166
Interestingly, this first case examined the presence of religion in one of the
environments that has provided the most material for debate among scholars:
public schools.167 The case before the Court regarded the constitutional
compatibility of teaching the Catholic religion in these institutions.168 Such a
curriculum was contemplated by the Lateran pacts and their subsequent
modifications; it is still imparted by teachers, who are subject to an
ecclesiastical approbation, only to students who ask to participate, while the

164

See GIOVANNI DI COSIMO, COSCIENZA E COSTITUZIONE 177 (2000).
Corte Cost., 11 aprile 1989, n. 203, para. 4 (It.).
166 See Finocchiaro, supra note 144, at 307.
167 See, e.g., Matias Manco, Esposizione del Crocifisso e Principio di Laicità dello Stato, 1 QUADERNI DI
DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 31, 34 (2005); Francesco Rimoli, Laicità, Postsecolarismo, Integrazione
Dell’estraneo: Una Sfida per la Democrazia Pluralista, 2 DIRITTO PUBBLICO 335, 335 (2006); Barbara
Randazzo, Laicità “Positiva” e Crocifisso nelle Aule Scolastiche: Incostituzionalità dell’Obbligo di
Esposizione e Incostituzionalità dell’obbligo di Rimozione, 4 QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI 841, 841 (2004).
168 Corte Cost., 11 aprile 1989, n. 203 (It.).
165

PIN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/28/2011 9:46 AM

THE ITALIAN SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

121

contents of the subject are the object of a joint agreement between the church
and the state.169
In its decisions, the Constitutional Court focused on two issues: whether
such a religious subject was consistent with the non-religious model of the
Italian state, and whether it constituted a form of discrimination for students
who refused the course.170 The Court affirmed that Italy is a state where the
principle of laicità rules, but endorsed a conception according to which laicità
“does not imply state indifference towards religion; but a duty of the state to
safeguard religious liberty, in a context of confessional and cultural
pluralism.”171 Moreover, the Court maintained that the principle “does not
require ideological and abstract theorizations of state or state leaders, noninvolvement or hostility towards the religion in itself or any religious belief,
but is a servant to the concrete needs of the civil and religious conscience of
the citizens.”172
Ultimately, the Court upheld the law concerning the teaching of Catholic
doctrine in public schools for students and students’ families who request it.173
The Court decided that teaching Catholicism in public schools was perfectly
consistent with the Italian interpretation of the laicità principle.174 To support
its position, it cited the pacts’ modifications whose provisions contemplate
Catholic teaching because of the “value of religious culture” and because
“Catholic values form part of the historical heritage of the Italian people.”175
169 Additional Protocol art. 4 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“a) L’insegnamento della religione cattolica nelle
scuole indicate al n. 2 è impartito—in conformità alla dottrina della Chiesa e nel rispetto della libertà di
coscienza degli alunni—da insegnanti che siano riconosciuti idonei dall’autorità ecclesiastica, nominati,
d’intesa con essa, dall’autorità scolastica. Nelle scuole materne ed elementari detto insegnamento può essere
impartito dall’insegnante di classe, riconosciuto idoneo dall’autorità ecclesiastica, che sia disposto a svolgerlo.
b) Con successiva intesa tra le competenti autorità scolastiche e la Conferenza episcopale italiana verranno
determinati: 1) I programmi dell’insegnamento della religione cattolica per i diversi ordini e gradi delle scuole
pubbliche; 2) Le modalità di organizzazione di tale insegnamento, anche in relazione alla collocazione nel
quadro degli orari delle lezioni; 3) I criteri per la scelta dei libri di testo; 4) I profili della qualificazione
professionale degli insegnanti.”).
170 Corte Cost., 11 aprile 1989, n. 203, para. 4 (It.).
171 Id.
172 Id. para. 7.
173 G. Floridia & Stefano Sicardi, Dall’Uguaglianza dei Cittadini alla Laicità dello Stato, 2
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 908, 1086 (1989).
174 L. Musselli, Insegnamento della Religione Cattolica e Tutela della Libertà Religiosa, 4
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 908, 909 (1989).
175 Additional Protocol art. 9 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“La Repubblica italiana, riconoscendo il valore
della cultura religiosa e tenendo conto che i principi del cattolicesimo fanno parte del patrimonio storico del
popolo italiano, continuerà ad assicurare, nel quadro delle finalità della scuola, l’insegnamento della religione
cattolica nelle scuole pubbliche non universitarie di ogni ordine e grado. Nel rispetto della libertà di coscienza
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The Court was very careful not to give any impression of endorsing the
French interpretation of laicità.176 When it referred to an “ideological, hostile
approach,” it was clearly referencing the French Enlightenment and its
revolutionary legacy that had fostered the widest separation between the
religious realm and the state.177 Since the word laicità is derived from French
culture—to the extent that the framers refused to use it—the use of the word
out of its original context was problematic.178
The introduction of this principle in the constitutional jurisprudence had
several effects on the doctrine and even on the understanding of laicità itself.
First, it was inconsistent with the traditional meaning of that very word, which
had been borrowed from the French concept of strict separation between
church and state.179 Second, this wording paved the way to a new
understanding of state laicità, one that was friendlier to religions.180 However,
this accomplishment could have been achieved through the exact application of
the constitutional provisions about religion and state, rather than incorporating
such a contentious word into the constitutional jurisprudence.181
A subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court on this matter—1991’s
Decision Number 13, which concerned the legitimacy of the teaching of
Catholic religion in schools—reaffirmed and further stressed the implications
of the principle of laicità as articulated by the 1989 decision, since it affirmed

e della responsabilità educativa dei genitori, è garantito a ciascuno il diritto di scegliere se avvalersi o non
avvalersi di detto insegnamento. All’atto dell’iscrizione gli studenti o i loro genitori eserciteranno tale diritto,
su richiesta dell’autorità scolastica, senza che la loro scelta possa dar luogo ad alcuna forma di
discriminazione.”).
176 Musselli, supra note 174, at 909.
177 TORTAROLO, supra note 103, at 7.
178 This is why the decision divided scholars into different factions. Some have endorsed the new
conception of laicità. See Floridia & Sicardi, supra note 173, at 1086. Others have maintained that the Court
used the word in an inappropriate way, just to describe the fundamental role of religious freedom and of the
principle of equality. See Finocchiaro, La Repubblica Italiana Non È uno Stato Laico, supra note 16, at 11. A
third faction strongly supported the importation of the French interpretation of the term—its aim was not to
adopt a hostile approach towards religion, but rather to foster a stronger separation between spiritual and state
power. See, e.g., LARICCIA, supra note 127, at 58. This faction wanted to weaken the public role of religions,
especially of the Catholic Church, rather than impeding or narrowing religious freedom. Id. This faction was
probably more disappointed by the effect of the Constitutional Court’s endorsement of the principle of laicità
than by the conception of the principle per se. See id. They would have supported the introduction of the word,
but they would have expected it to have different implications on the relationship between religion and state.
See id.
179 Musselli, supra note 174, at 909.
180 CAVANA, supra note 9, at 256.
181 PIN, supra note 54, at 142.
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that teaching Catholic doctrine in public schools is not only consistent with but
even represents an application of the principle of laicità.182
This combination of decisions, which opened an intense jurisprudential
effort and a strong doctrinal debate, shows that the Court’s interpretation of the
laicità principle synthesized constitutional provisions concerning the
relationship between church and state.183 Therefore, the laicità principle
articulated by the Court: (1) adheres to the fundamental principle of equality
that characterizes the treatment of individuals as well as of religions; (2)
acknowledges the historical role of Catholicism in Italy that the Constitution
implicitly recognizes; and (3) allows for the collaborative approach that the
Constitution foresees through the system of agreements between religions and
the state.184
This version of laicità is very distant from the word’s modern roots in the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution.185 The Constitutional Court used
the word to define synthetically the religious freedom and the relationship
between religion and state that are embedded in the Constitution.186 Those
constitutional provisions have little to do with the French strict separation of
church and state, which was conceived in opposition to Catholicism.187 On the
contrary, Article 7 of the Italian Constitution is indebted to the Catholic
doctrine, and the principle of laicità as used by the Court does not command
any hostile or even separatist approach of the state toward religions.188
The implication of the development of Italian laicità, therefore, is that
religion is welcome in public institutions and is not required to be absent from
them. According to the Constitutional Court’s first decisions, the treatment of
pluralism that is embedded in the Constitution is therefore the opposite of the

182 Corte Cost., 11 gennaio 1991, n. 13 (It.). The original wording of the Constitutional Court is as
follows: “L’insegnamento di religione cattolica, compreso tra gli altri insegnamenti del piano didattico, con
pari dignità culturale, come previsto nella normativa di fonte pattizia, non è causa di discriminazione e non
contrasta—essendone anzi una manifestazione—col principio supremo di laicità dello Stato.” Corte Cost., 11
aprile 1989, n. 203, para. 2 (It.).
183 Barbera, supra note 11, at 42.
184 Id. at 38.
185 Giovanni Di Cosimo, Simboli Religiosi nei Locali Pubblici: Le Mobili Frontiere dell’Obiezione di
Coscienza, 2 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 1130, 1139 (2000).
186 Id.
187 CAVANA, supra note 9, at 15.
188 Sicardi, supra note 94, at 9; Barbera, supra note 11, at 42.
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French laicità’s paradigm, which demands for the exclusion of religion from
public institutions.189
2. Neutrality: A New Season for the Constitutional Court
In decisions following the aforementioned cases, the Constitutional Court
significantly changed its attitude towards the conception of laicità.190 The
theory of an open, friendly attitude of public institutions toward religion was
replaced by a new doctrine demanding that public institutions and religions
remain more distant from each other.191 In this new season, the Constitutional
Court still largely uses the concept of laicità but introduces a new lexicon by
using the word “neutrality”192—the very same word that has been used by the
ECHR precisely to depict the relationship between religion and state.
This shift is apparent in part because of the outcome of the decisions, but
mainly because of the arguments the Court has employed to define the
principle. This trend has been observed by many commentators of this new
season193—interestingly, almost all have come to believe that the Court has
positioned itself within the long, traditional history of the laicità principle, as
inherited from France.194 Even though the Court did not derive the hostile
approach from the French tradition, it has increasingly advocated a stronger
separation between church and state.195
It must be clarified that the Court adopted the new wording without being
fully aware of this change. As we will see, it started by defining the principle

189 Francesco Patruno, Crocifisso, Giurisprudenza Straniera e Laicità, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE
LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE, 1 (June 2005), http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/documents/Patruno_
crocifisso.pdf.
190 PIN, supra note 54, at 149.
191 Id.
192 See Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.). This decision was the landmark in this shift in
constitutional jurisprudence.
193 Paolo Cavana, La Questione del Crocifisso in Italia, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTÀ ED
ISTITUZIONI
RELIGOSE,
7
(May
2004),
http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/documents/Cavana_
questionedelcrocifisso.pdf.
194 Francesco Rimoli, Tutela del Sentimento Religioso, Principio di Eguaglianza e Laicità dello Stato, 6
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 3343, 3343 (1997); Barbara Randazzo, La Corte Apre al Giudizio di
Uguaglianza tra Confessioni Religiose?, 3 GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 1843, 1843 (1998); Giuseppe
Casuscelli, Libertà Religiosa Collettiva e Nuove Intese con le Minoranze Confessionali, STATO, CHIESE E
PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, 6–7 (Mar. 2008), http://www.statoechiese.it/images/stories/2008.3/
casuscelli_libertm.pdf.
195 See Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1134 (endorsing this change); Randazzo, supra note 194, at 1866
(highlighting the difference from the previous Constitutional Court’s attitude).
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as implying “impartiality,” “equidistance,” and—above all—“neutrality,”
without explaining why it preferred these words and the relationship between
each of them.196 Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the main issue concerns the
relationship between religion and state that is best understood if one focuses on
the term “neutrality,” which the Court uses to portray the necessity of a clear
separation between church and state.197
This shift can be seen in 1995’s Decision Number 440.198 The Court
partially struck down a provision of the penal code sanctioning offenses to
“God and the persons and symbols venerated by the state religion.”199 The
penal code was created during the 1930s, when the state was officially
religious—so the justices interpreted the reference to the state religion as
meaning Catholicism.200 In the name of equality, the Court annulled the
provision only partially.201 In order to keep the protection concerning
religiosity, it conserved the punishment for the offence to God but struck down
the part that punished the offences to the persons and the symbols venerated by
the former official religion (Catholicism); this could not be consistent with
Italian equality, which was implied by the principle of laicità, since it
discriminated between religions in terms of their protection.202
Due to the intervention of the Court, Catholicism lost its special protection
against offenses to its main historical figures and liturgy, but was protected
from any offense to God.203 Moreover, because there was no explicit mention
of the Catholic deity, the phrasing of the article was changed to extend the
protection from offenses of the divine to believers of other faiths.204

196

See, e.g., Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.).
Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1134.
198 Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.).
199 Art. 724 Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p.] (It.).
200 See Marilisa D’Amico, Una Nuova Figura di Reato: La Bestemmia contro la “Divinità,” 3
GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 3487, 3488 (1995).
201 See Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440, para. 4.3 (It.).
202 Id. para. 5 (“La scelta attuale del legislatore di punire la bestemmia, una volta depurata del suo
riferimento ad una sola fede religiosa, non è dunque di per sè in contrasto con i principi costituzionali,
tutelando in modo non discriminatorio un bene che è comune a tutte le religioni che caratterizzano oggi la
nostra comunità nazionale, nella quale hanno da convivere fedi, culture e tradizioni diverse.”).
203 Id. para. 5.
204 Actually, the Court could not extend the crime to persons and symbols venerated by any religion, since
it cannot expand the area of penal laws, according to the Italian Constitution. Art. 13.1 Costituzione [Cost.]
(It.). Nevertheless, it might have expressed an admonition to Parliament in order to restore the broader
protection of religiosity. ANTONIO RUGGERI & ANTONINO SPADARO, LINEAMENTI DI GIUSTIZIA
COSTITUZIONALE 271 (2009).
197
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The decision deprived the most important religious figure of the largest
Italian religious group—the Christian community’s Jesus—of any protections.
Therefore, an important element of the provision’s protection became
dependent on a choice to be made by the courts interpreting the rule as
reformed by the Constitutional Court; a court could choose between the
Christian vantage point and the “neutral” one. In other words, a court could
decide to identify Jesus with God, as Christians do, and therefore apply the law
to offenses against Jesus—but this could be seen as an endorsement of a
Christian vantage point. The only other choice would consist of avoiding such
identification, remaining “neutral” in respect to any religion and therefore not
applying the law. The latter choice might be seen as egalitarian precisely
because it does not endorse any specific religious vantage point. Although the
Court did not use the word “neutrality,” the final implications of such an
approach seem to consist of diminishing the protection of religious figures and,
more precisely, the introduction of an alternative, “neutral” view to the
traditional Catholic one.
It was only in a following decision that the concept of “neutrality” was
explicitly mentioned by the Court.205 Interestingly, the Constitutional Court
introduced this principle in its decision even though it was not necessary.206
The 1997 Decision Number 235 concerned the different fiscal treatment of
some Jewish institutions in light of the treatment that was accorded to some
Catholic institutions by some Italian tax laws.207 The Court dismissed the case,
concluding that the Catholic and the Jewish institutions that were brought to its
attention had different purposes and therefore could legitimately be treated
differently under Italian law.208
In addressing the case, the Court mentioned the principle of neutrality,
which had never been cited before in its jurisprudence.209 According to the
Court, this principle required the state to be “neutral” towards every religion.210

205

Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.).
Randazzo, supra note 194, at 1866.
207 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.). Namely, the tax exemptions that were accorded to
Catholic institutions were Law Number 994 and Law Number 222. Legge 16 dicembre 1977, n. 994, art. 8
(It.); Legge 20 maggio 1985, n. 222, art. 45 (It.).
208 Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.).
209 Id.
210 Stefano Sicardi, Il Principio di Laicità nella Giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, RIVISTA
DELL’ASSOCIAZIONE
ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI, pt. 2 (Sept. 2007), http://www.
associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/convegni/200611foggia/sicardi2.html. “[R]ispetto della neutralità
dello Stato in materia religiosa nei confronti di tutte.” Id.
206
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This introduction of “neutrality” was not necessarily required to decide the
case. The Court could have used the principle of laicità, which did not relate to
neutrality, or simply focused on the principle of “equality,” which is well
rooted in the constitutional text as well as in the Court’s jurisprudence. Even
though it was provided with these concepts, the Court preferred to introduce
the neutrality principle to express the proper attitude of the state toward
religions.
In short, the 1990s were characterized by the Constitutional Court’s intense
activity in the realm of religious liberty. Its most meaningful efforts were
intended to stress the importance of the principles of “neutrality” and
“impartiality.” These words are obviously related to laicità; nevertheless, it is
apparent that these concepts were used in the constitutional jurisprudence to
increase the distance between the church and the state.
Indeed, neutrality and impartiality do not simply express the equality
principle or adequately reflect the definition of laicità as depicted in the
previous Constitutional Court’s trend. The neutrality principle is linked to the
French constitutional model that conceives religion and state as separate
entities and has clearly been used by the Court in this sense.211 In its recent
decisions, the Constitutional Court has changed its view about how the state
should govern religious pluralism—from an attitude that fosters the
collaboration between church and state, the Court has shifted to a new
paradigm which requires religion and state to remain distinctly separate from
each other.
D. Neutrality Goes to School: The Crucifix
Other courts soon followed the Constitutional Court’s principle of
neutrality, specifically in addressing cases that concerned public schools.
Neutrality was successfully used as the crucial criteria to distinguish between
what is and is not allowed in public schools.
The Italian political and legal environments have been continuously
involved in the topic of religion at school. There are various reasons for this:
first, because there are some constitutional provisions about private schools212
211 See Henri Astier, The Deep Roots of French Secularism, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2004, 2:39 PM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3325285.stm.
212 Art. 33 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“[2] The republic adopts general norms for education and establishes
public schools of all kinds and grades. [3] Public and private bodies have the right to establish schools and
educational institutes without financial obligations to the state. [4] The law defining rights and obligations of
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and Catholic education and second, because public schools have historically
been a battleground between the domains of the church and the state.213
The first episode addressing the presence of the crucifix in public schools
dates back to the 1980s, even before the Court’s introduction of the principle
of laicità.214 In 1988, upon the government’s request, the Council of State
delivered an opinion concerning the presence of crucifixes in schools.215 It said
that the crucifix was consistent with the constitutional principle of freedom of
religion and of conscience since it did not impede on the freedom of speech
and did not inhibit discussion in the classrooms.216 It simply reflected the
cultural roots of the Italian state, and therefore it had to be considered as a
cultural sign rather than a religious one.217
But a sudden increase in debates about the meaning and the implications of
the principle of laicità started less than a decade ago in 2000, when several
courts were petitioned to decide about the presence of Christian symbols in
public schools.218
1. The Judgment of the Court of Cassation
The first Italian case concerning the crucifix was only indirectly linked
with the presence of the crucifix at a public school. It originated when a man
who had been called to work at the ballots refused to obey and was therefore
prosecuted according to a penal rule sanctioning people who do not comply
with this mandatory duty.219 He refused to take part in the election operations
because he personally endorsed the principle of laicità and did not want to
work in connection with polls that were held in public schools, where the
crucifix was present.220 He did not want to be associated with such a symbol,
even though the classroom where he was actually placed did not have a
crucifix inside.221

those private schools requesting recognition has to guarantee full liberty to them and equal treatment with
pupils of public schools.”).
213 See Manco, supra note 167, at 44.
214 Cons. Stato, 27 aprile 1988, n. 63 (It.).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See Ventura, supra note 128, at 924.
218 See id. at 922.
219 Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439 (It.).
220 Id.
221 Id.
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The case finally arrived at the Court of Cassation.222 The Court does not
have the power to annul legal or administrative rules; its general task is to
grant a uniform interpretation of the laws.223 In this case, the Court had to
examine if the previous judges were correct in interpreting the rule and
delivering the sanction.224 Nevertheless, the impact of the Court’s decision was
critical for the development of Italian jurisprudence on the principle of
laicità.225
The Court reversed the judgments and excused the defendant accused of
violating the law.226 The Court of Cassation believed that the refusal was
justified because of the personal endorsement of the principle of laicità and
because the presence of the crucifix was not consistent with constitutional
provisions.227
The Court of Cassation’s decision represents a sort of summa of the
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence of the nineties, both because of its
wording and its rationale. The Court of Cassation could have contradicted the
Council of State and endorsed the opinion that the symbol could influence the
freedom of conscience of the people working at the ballots. However, this
would not have dealt with the accusation involved in that specific case since
there was no crucifix in that room.228 Therefore, this would have meant an
implicit affirmation of the display of the crucifix, but the defendant would have
been found guilty.
Conversely, the Court of Cassation recalled the principle of laicità, clearly
identifying it with the “neutrality” and the “impartiality” of public
administration.229 This interpretation was helped by the constitutional article
affirming that public administration is impartial230—a provision that had not
been used before to describe the principle of laicità or to portray the state’s
attitude toward religion.

222

Id.
Regio Decreto 30 gennaio 1941, n. 12 (It.).
224 Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, paras. 2–3 (It.).
225 Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1139.
226 Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, para. 9 (It.).
227 Id.
228 See PIN, supra note 54, at 162.
229 Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, para. 6 (It.).
230 Art. 97 Costitutizione [Cost.] (It.) (“The organization of public offices is determined by law ensuring
the proper and fair operation of public affairs.”).
223
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According to the Court of Cassation, the presence of the crucifix at school
was inconsistent with the Italian Constitution; not simply because its presence
violated freedom of conscience, but mostly because it infringed on the
principle of laicità.231 The Court focused on this aspect by underlining the
relationship between the symbol and the state, rather than focusing on the
symbol and the people who were obliged to be in the presence of such a
symbol.232
As a result of the decision, the man on trial was discharged.233 But the
indirect effect was essentially a declaration that the crucifix in the public
school was unconstitutional.234 Even though such an affirmation did not have
any effect on the display of the crucifix,235 it had important political and
juridical implications, because it came from an authoritative body such as the
Court of Cassation, whose primary role is the uniform application of rules
throughout Italy.236
Based on the Court’s decision, it is apparent that the Italian version of
laicità was moving toward the French paradigm.237 Furthermore, it is
significant that the decision implicitly considered the principle of laicità as
having two aspects. The first aspect regarded the state’s institutional attitude
toward religion and culture.238 The second aspect concerned the ideological
meaning of the principle.239 The Court considered that the man on trial had
231

Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, para. 9 (It.).
Id. para. 7. Now, the Court could also draw on the German experience and the debate that it had raised
throughout continental Europe. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had declared the presence of the
crucifix to be unconstitutional because it contaminated the secular realm and profaned a religious sign through
its public display. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 16, 1995, 93
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Crucifix
Case]. Thus, the Italian court drew on this foreign decision, endorsed the “neutral” version of the principle of
laicità, and maintained that the presence of the symbol would violate the students’ consciences and thoughts as
well as the religious character of the crucifix. Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439 (It.).
233 Id.
234 See Ventura, supra note 128, at 922–23.
235 Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1139.
236 Le Funzioni della Corte di Cassazione, CORTE SUPREMA DI CASSAZIONE, http://www.
cortedicassazione.it/Cassazione/Cassazione.asp# (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
237 The Court’s decision was welcomed by scholars who supported a stronger separation between church
and state. Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1135. Other scholars openly criticized the decision because such a
rationale would be inconsistent with the Constitutional Court’s precedents, which were more open to a
relationship between state and religion. See, e.g., Francesco Patruno, Riflessioni sul Valore delle Pronunce
Straniere in Tema di Esposizione del Crocifisso, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, para. 1 (Nov. 2003),
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=content&task=view&id=700.
238 Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, para. 7 (It.).
239 Id. para. 19.
232
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personally endorsed the principle of laicità and so his conscience could be
violated by the exposition of religious signs.240 Through this reasoning, the
Court admitted that such a principle is not just a standard for public powers—it
is also a moral principle since people can adhere to it as to a personal ideal.241
Obviously, laicità can be interpreted in both ways; but one must distinguish
between the two meanings and realize the fact that the first decisions of the
Italian Constitutional Court did not concern this ideological perspective. The
Court of Cassation did not make any distinction. The Court of Cassation’s
interpretation of the previous affirmations of the Constitutional Court, which
originally concerned only the public powers and the space for Catholic
teaching at schools, acquired an ideological value.242
240

Id. The Court spoke of
un conflitto tra la personale adesione al principio supremo di laicità dello Stato e l’adempimento
dell’incarico a causa dell’organizzazione elettorale in relazione alla presenza nella dotazione
obbligatoria di arredi dei locali destinati a seggi elettorali, pur se casualmente non di quello di
specifica designazione, del crocifisso o di altre immagini religiose.

Id.
241

Id.
One can go further and argue that the foreign case mentioned by the Court does not necessarily support
the opinion of the Court of Cassation, but it might even support the opposite one. Some authors have correctly
observed that the Court’s decisions are necessarily influenced by and even reflect, to some extent, the same
religious and cultural traditions of the places where they are released. See Paolo Cavana, Modelli di Laicità
nelle Società Pluraliste. La Questione dei Simboli Religiosi nello Spazio Pubblico, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO
DELLE LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE, 6 (Apr. 2005), http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/102/documents/
Cavana_Campobasso.pdf. The most meaningful example can be seen in the German case that was mentioned
by the Court of Cassation. Corte Cost., 25 ottobre 2000, n. 439, para. 7 (It.). A law of the German State of
Bavaria requested that the cross be displayed in public schools and the Constitutional Tribunal intervened and
struck down the law. Id. A few months later, Bavaria enforced a new law prescribing the exposition of the
cross but permitting its removal only if it offended students, and only after a dialogue between the students’
families and the school’s management. See Ceccanti, supra note 31, at 10.
It is interesting to notice that Bavaria insisted on keeping the cross in the schools, while the
Constitutional Tribunal maintained that public display of religious symbols did not only contaminate the
public sphere, but also profaned religious signs because it detached them from their religious context and
introduced them into a profane sphere. Id. The entire German affair seems to reflect the distance between the
Protestant vision and the Catholic vision. The first sees the cross as a symbol that reminds people of the vanity
of the earthly world, while the second believes the crucifix to be an open affirmation of universal values to
which earthly life must be aligned. Id. Bavaria is the most Catholic part of Germany and supported the public
display of religious signs simply by adapting its rules to the Constitutional Court’s decision. Id. Conversely,
the German Tribunal reflected the wider Protestant culture when it considered the profanation of the religion.
Cavana, supra note 40, at 6. “In Germania, e più in generale nei paesi protestanti, la croce assume per lo più un
significato di condanna delle realtà terrene, e si comprende pertanto come la sua presenza nei luoghi pubblici e
nelle istituzioni possa assumere il senso di una profanazione di realtà o simboli sacri.” Id. On the contrary,
according to the Catholic tradition “il crocifisso è percepito come simbolo di valori universali, destinati a
incarnarsi nella realtà umana e ad operare anche all’interno delle istituzioni. Si tratta di una differente lettura
teologica del simbolo sacro che è parte integrante delle tradizioni dei singoli paesi.” Id. Moreover, Italian
242
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Thus, the development of the principle of laicità has strayed quite far from
its origin in Italian jurisprudence.243 Its new implication—the elimination of
religious symbols from the public place—is not consistent with the first
decisions of the Constitutional Court.244 The Court of Cassation detached the
principle from its Italian origins and placed it closer to the French tradition.245
The Court of Cassation’s decision was important in the Italian history of
the principle. It endorsed a doctrine that was most influenced by French
constitutional heritage. Moreover, by virtually depriving the principle of laicità
of its original Italian meaning, the Court of Cassation pushed towards a
redefinition of the principle by opening the way to a more traditional
interpretation of the concept.246 It did so by saying that such an interpretation
was inconsistent with the Italian precedent and more in accord with the
historical characters of the principle. This new jurisprudence fostered a
treatment of religious pluralism that was more akin to the French model.
2. The Crucifix and the Students
Some years later, a Muslim father of primary school students asked for the
removal of the crucifix from the classroom of his two children.247 The civil
tribunal ordered a provisional removal in order to protect the students’
consciences until it decided the case.248 Given that the merits of the case were
decided by a different court, the civil tribunal never delivered the final
decision.249 But its provisory order was widely discussed because it endorsed

scholarship provides evidence of the strong influence of the religious culture over cases such as this. Among
the many Italian scholars who have criticized the display of the cross, one can find very few people
maintaining that religion itself would suffer a violation of its pureness if the state were to display religious
signs. This seems to be a symptom of the historical role of Catholic thought, even among intellectuals who are
adverse to the public display of the crucifix. Gian Enrico Rusconi, Discorso Pubblico e Discorso Teologico:
La Strategia Comunicativa di Papa Ratzinger, 5 IL MULINO 771, 779 (2007), available at
www.mulino.it/rivisteweb/anteprima.php?id_articolo=25194.
243 Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1135.
244 See supra text accompanying note 148.
245 PIN, supra note 54, at 166.
246 Di Cosimo, supra note 185, at 1135.
247 Sophie Arie, Muslim Wins Italian Court Ban on Crucifixes in Classroom, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 27,
2003, 2:09 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/27/italy.sophiearie.
248 Lautsi I, supra note 1.
249 The Regional Administrative Tribunal dismissed the case, thereby upholding the presence of the
crucifix. Id. Nevertheless, it did not give any new rationales therefore it can be omitted.
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the Court of Cassation’s position and justified the rationale with the help of
historical and cultural arguments.250
In the opinion of the L’Aquila court, the state and its bodies cannot express
a preference for any specific religion or culture and their equidistance should
be preserved and affirmed by avoiding any public display of religious
symbols.251 Moreover, according to the tribunal, the presence of the crucifix
would threaten the religious and ideological freedom and education of the
students.252 It would not just be a traditional symbol, simply expressing the
legacy of the Italian culture. Rather it would be read as an affirmation of the
absolute value of one faith and one belief at the expense of all others.253
One last point of the Court’s order must be underlined adequately because
it contains meaningful affirmations about the role of education in a pluralistic
context. The tribunal stressed the importance of affirming laicità in a place like
the school, which it depicted as prescribing a clear separation between church
and state.254 The tribunal recognized that the school was a major battlefield
between the Catholic Church and the state.255 For several decades, both
proclaimed different ideologies and tried to impose their own ideals and ethics
over society through the education of young people.256 In the tribunal’s
opinion, this historical reason fostered the principle of laicità as a cornerstone
of Italian ideology.257

250 See generally Michele Madonna, L’esposizione del Crocifisso nelle Aule Scolastiche dal Caso di
Ofena all’Ordinanza della Corte Costituzionale n. 389 del 13 Dicembre 2004: Brevi Note su una Questione
Ancora Aperta, OLIR: OSSERVATORIO DELLE LIBERTÀ ED ISTITUZIONI RELIGOSE (Dec. 2004), http://www.olir.
it/areetematiche/75/documents/Madonna_crocifisso.pdf; Lorenzo Ascanio, Brevi Riflessioni Sull’ordinanza del
Tribunale de L’Aquila sul Crocefisso nelle aule Scolastiche, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (Nov.
2003),
http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index3.php?option=content&task=view&id=693;
Michele
Toffoli, Crocifissi e Laicità dello Stato nelle Recenti Ordinanze del Tribunale dell’Aquila, RIVISTA
DELL’ASSOCIAZIONE
ITALIANA
DEI
COSTITUZIONALISTI
(Dec.
2003),
http://www.
associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/cronache/file/crocifisso.html.
251 Tribunale di L’Aquila, 23 ottobre 2003, G.U. Montanaro, para. 5 (It.).
252 Id.
253 This would put the “culto cattolico al centro dell’universo, come verità assoluta, senza il minimo
rispetto per il ruolo svolto dalle altre esperienze religiose e sociali nel processo storico dello sviluppo umano,
trascurando completamente le loro inevitabili relazioni e i loro reciproci condizionamenti.” Tribunale di
L’Aquila, 23 ottobre 2003, Altalex 2006, available at http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=10377.
254 Tribunale di L’Aquila, 23 ottobre 2003, G.U. Montanaro (It.).
255 Id.
256 Id. “Dall’unità d’Italia la scuola costituisce [. . . ] terreno tradizionale di confronto fra gli interessi
ideologici dello Stato e della Chiesa, forse l’oggetto privilegiato delle pretese confessionali e probabilmente,
quindi, anche il luogo ove si avverte più forte l’esigenza di laicità.” Id.
257 Id.
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After describing the ideological conflict between the church and the state,
the tribunal endorsed laicità as a distinguishing feature of the state’s ideology
and issued the order to remove the Christian symbol.258 Thus, the tribunal’s
idea of separation of church and state was intended to be for the state’s sake
rather than for the students’ sake.259 Unless one believes that the state always
takes care of younger generations better than religious denominations do, it
must be recognized that the tribunal wanted to assure that students are
educated according to the state’s values rather than according to values that
derive from the prevailing Catholic culture.260 In the tribunal’s opinion,
students should be educated to place their allegiance to the Italian state before
their allegiance to Catholicism or to the Catholic culture.261
The Court’s rationale highlighted the opposition between the state’s
interests and the religion’s interests in education as one of the features of
laicità. This opposition is quite new in Italian jurisprudence and stands in
contrast to the first Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence,262 which had
underlined the links between religion and state, and fostered a principle of
“collaboration” between the Catholic Church and public institutions that is
embedded in the 1984 pact between Italy and the Church.263
E. The Journey of Laicità
It will suffice to underline the analogies between the different trends of the
constitutional jurisprudence and other courts. The first decisions regarding the
state support for Christian culture and its symbols264 are closer to the rationale
of the Administrative Tribunal of Veneto in the case of the crucifix which
opened this Article, while the latter ones265 are closer to the judgment of the
Court of Cassation, the L’Aquila order, and even the ECHR’s positions.266
258

Id.
Id.
260 See id.
261 See, e.g., Giovanni Cimbalo, Laicità come Strumento di Educazione alla Convivenza, STATO, CHIESE E
PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, 26 (Mar. 2007), http://ecclesiastico.giuri.unibo.it/uploads/file/insegnamento/
cimbalo_laicita.pdf.
262 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 11 gennaio 1991, n. 13 (It.); Corte Cost., 17 maggio 1989, n. 293 (It.).
263 Art. 1 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“La Repubblica italiana e la Santa Sede riaffermano che lo Stato e la
Chiesa cattolica sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine, indipendenti e sovrani, impegnandosi al pieno rispetto di
tale principio nei loro rapporti e alla reciproca collaborazione per la promozione dell’uomo e il bene del
Paese.”).
264 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 11 gennaio 1991, n. 19 (It.); Corte Cost., 11 aprile 1989, n. 203 (It.).
265 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.); Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.).
266 See PIN, supra note 54, at 196–97; Patruno, supra note 237, at 1.
259
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These courts’ decisions embraced the idea of neutrality, often demanding a
strong separation between church and state.
The principle of laicità has taken a long path in Italian jurisprudence. The
constitutional jurisprudence first depicted it as a synthetic description of
constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom and the relationship
between church and state, characterized by the possibility of strong connection
and even of collaboration between the two.267 According to this approach, the
governance of religious pluralism consisted of activating new relationships
with religions other than Catholicism through negotiation as well as admitting
religion in public institutions.268 Later on, the principle of laicità was
interpreted as mandating some separation between religion and state.269 The
distance between the religious and the secular realms was believed to be
necessary for the protection of public institutions as well as the right tool to
govern pluralism.270
III. WHAT LIES BENEATH: A KULTURKAMPF
The very dynamic interpretation of the constitutional provisions has seen a
powerful shift of the Italian jurisprudence from a pro-Catholic and pro-religion
reading towards a more “neutral” one. The tension between the two
interpretations of the very same provisions derives from a huge political and
cultural Italian debate that opposes Catholic culture to a separatist one.271
The fluctuations of the Italian jurisprudence between a traditional, proCatholic, religious-friendly reading of the Italian Constitution and a more
separatist one272 are the judicial counterpart of an ongoing struggle that
concerns the role of religion in Italian society and politics. It is worth pointing
out that the public role of the Catholic Church is one of the main factors of
debate, especially if one considers the field of public education.273

267

See, e.g., Corte Cost., 11 gennaio 1991, n. 13 (It.); Corte Cost., 17 maggio 1989, n. 293 (It.).
See, e.g., Corte Cost., 11 gennaio 1991, n. 13 (It.); Corte Cost., 17 maggio 1989, n. 293 (It.).
269 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.); Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.).
270 Massimo Luciani, La Problematica Laicità Italiana, 2 DEMOCRAZIA E DIRITTO 105, 133 (2008).
271 See Nicola Colaianni, La Laicità tra Costituzione e Globalizzazione, FORUM DI QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI, 1 (Nov. 2008), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/
paper/0080_colaianni.pdf.
272 GIOVANNI DI COSIMO, COSCIENZA E COSTITUZIONE 177 (1990).
273 See generally ENRICO MINNEI, SCUOLA PUBBLICA E SCUOLA PRIVATA: GLI ONERI PER LO STATO,
(2003) (illustrating the debate over the possibilities for private schools to be financed with public resources,
which has been one of the major battlefields).
268
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It is not by chance that this lively debate about what laicità really is has
been endlessly reshaped not just by legal scholars and courts, but also by the
main protagonists of the public debate, such as politicians,274 thinkers,275 and
polemists.276
The rebirth of religious thinking and life,277 scientific accomplishments,278
and the multicultural conundrum279 are only some of the topics that keep the
relationship between law and religion at the core of the political agenda in
Italy.280
This is largely due to several issues that have arisen mainly because of the
plurality of cultures, traditions, and ideals, which are increasing both from the
arrival of immigrants and from the development of new cultural and social
trends, such as people conceiving children through artificial means, ending
one’s own life in special medical circumstances, or same-sex couples
demanding official recognition of their relationship.
Advocates of episodes of euthanasia,281 the national legislation on in vitro
fertilization,282 and same-sex partnerships283 have opposed the Catholic Church
with new political views, advocating for the introduction of new liberties that
are opposed to Catholic doctrine.284 The confrontation between different
vantage points has often become a confrontation about the influential role that

274

Some politicians have dealt with this topic extensively. See, e.g., MARCELLO PERA, PERCHÉ
DOBBIAMO DIRCI CRISTIANI 5 (2008). For the new edition of the former Italian Republic President’s final
dissertation, see CARLO AZEGLIO CIAMPI, LA LIBERTÀ RELIGIOSA DELLE MINORANZE IN ITALIA (2009).
275 See, e.g., LAICITÀ: UNA GEOGRAFIA DELLE NOSTRE RADICI (Giovanni Boniolo ed., 2006).
276 See, e.g., PIERGIORGIO ODIFREDDI, PERCHÉ NON POSSIAMO ESSERE CRISTIANI (E MENO CHE MAI
CATTOLICI) (2007); SERGIO ROMANO, LIBERA CHIESA: LIBERO STATO? (2005).
277 This trend began in the 1990s. See GILLES KEPEL, LA REVANCHE DE DIEU 25 (1991).
278 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TRA FEDE E SCIENZA (2006).
279 PIERPAOLO DONATI, OLTRE IL MULTICULTURALISMO 7 (2008); PAOLO GOMARASCA, METICCIATO:
CONVIVENZA O CONFUSIONE? 5 (2009).
280 Stefano Ceccanti & Susanna Mancini, Come Reagiscono gli Ordinamenti Giuridici alle Culture
Altre?, in MULTICULTURALISMO: IDEOLOGIE E SFIDE 164, 167–68 (Carlo Galli ed., 2006).
281 See generally Tania Groppi, Il “Caso Englaro”: Un Viaggio alle Origini dello Stato di Diritto e
Ritorno, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (May 2009), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/
stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0120_groppi.pdf (discussing the deaths of Eluana Englaro, who was in a
vegetative state and deprived of nutrition until her passing on February 9, 2009, and Piergiorgio Welby, who
suffered from severe muscular dystrophy and was removed from a respirator, passing on October 20, 2006).
282 Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40 (It.). The provisions have been matter of huge debate. See LA
FECONDAZIONE ASSISTITA NEL DIRITTO COMPARATO 2 (Carlo Casonato & Tommaso E. Fronsi eds., 2006).
283 A bill regulating same-sex partnerships was presented to Parliament on February 8, 2007 by the Italian
Council of Ministers, and then abandoned. See MARILISA D’AMICO, I DIRITTI CONTESI 99 (2008).
284 See id. at 133.
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Catholicism plays in shaping the political agenda and influencing voters as
well as about the legitimacy of such a role for the Catholic Church.285
In short, the debate over the separation of church and state mainly concerns
a key topic—the cultural and political role of Catholicism with respect to the
increasing pluralism of the Italian population.286
A. The Catholic Church and Politics
The large identification of the Italian people with the Catholic Church and
the influence of Catholic social thought on the public sphere have concentrated
a large part of the debate on laicità into one single question—is it possible for
the Catholic Church to speak openly about political issues in the public area,
even by inviting Catholics to hold certain political attitudes or telling them
who or what to vote for and when to vote (or not)?287 It is not by chance that
the same discussion about the display of the crucifix and the Catholic influence
over children’s education originated from the fear that Catholicism might
monopolize Italian political life through the education of youth.288
The contemporary political landscape fuels the debate and makes finding
an answer to this question more urgent. Until approximately 1992, the political
voice of Catholics was primarily represented by the Christian Democratic
Party, which—at least formally—was linked to Rome’s social teaching and
was expected to foster it in Parliament.289 In this sense, the Catholic Church

285

GIAN ENRICO RUSCONI, COME SE DIO NON CI FOSSE 119 (2000).
GIAN ENRICO RUSCONI, NON ABUSARE DI DIO: PER UN’ETICA LAICA 8 ( 2007); ZAGREBELSKY, supra
note 2, at 71.
287 See ROMANO, supra note 276, at 3; RUSCONI, supra note 286, at 160–68; Leopoldo Elia, Introduzione
ai Problemi della Laicità, RIVISTA DELL’ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI, 12 (Oct. 2007),
http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/materiali/convegni/aic200710/elia.pdf.
288 See RUSCONI, supra note 286, at 63–74. Interestingly, Romano Prodi, while President of the Council,
had to face the fierce opposition of Catholic bishops to a referendum held from June 12 to 13, 2005, that aimed
to enlarge the possibility of using the in vitro fertilization law. Italian Referendum on Assisted Reproduction:
Discussing the Appeal to Abstain by Italian Bishops, DAWNOFEUROPE, http://dawnofeurope.blogspot.com/
2005/05/italian-referendum-on-assisted.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). While the bishops called for a large
abstention that would lead to the failure of the referendum, Prodi went to vote, notwithstanding his notorious
Catholic faith. Id. When he was asked the reasons for disobeying the indications of bishops, he replied that he
considered himself an adult Catholic, suggesting that he knew how to apply the values he was raised with,
without the help of bishops. Id.
289 Background Note: Italy, U.S. DEP’T ST. (May 12, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
4033.htm. It must be remembered that the way that Christian Democracy fostered the Catholic Church doctrine
in politics was widely discussed, at least starting from the 1970s. See VERA CAPPERUCCI, IL PARTITO DEI
CATTOLICI 19 (2010). This did not depend solely on the moral coherence of Catholic politicians, but also—and
286
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could limit its action in influencing and backing the Christian Democratic
Party’s agenda. With the dissolution of that party—due to broad internal
corruption and the interventions of many penal courts throughout Italy—there
ceased to be any formal relation between politics and the Catholic faith.290
Thus, the Italian Church has begun to speak more openly and directly to
citizens about the issues that are crucial to Catholic ethics.291 Therefore,
starting from the 1990s, the Church and the Italian bishops have addressed
Catholic believers regarding the role of moral values in the political realm
more openly.292
If one considers the first Constitutional Court’s endorsement of laicità, it is
not possible to respond to the question that asks, “Can the Church speak, and,
if so, in which ways?” Italian jurisprudence does not help because it has
fluctuated in interpreting laicità to the extent that one can find both decisions
that uphold the presence of Catholic symbols at schools as well as decisions
that declare it to be against the Constitution.293
It is quite understandable that the debate focuses on the role of Catholicism
in public schools in a time of pluralism. Now this Article briefly goes back to
the topic of religion at school to see how the display of the Crucifix is
considered in face of the increasing pluralism. Then the Article turns to
consider the part that the ECHR has taken in this confrontation with the Lautsi
decision.
B. Catholicism, Education, and Public Schools
The attention of the courts concerning the relationship between religion and
state is mainly concentrated within the realm of religion at school. This is the
result of a more general trend, which extends to many European countries

perhaps mostly—on the lack of attention that the party gave to crucial Catholic principles like subsidiarity. See
id.
290 See id. at 451–55.
291 See Il Papa: La Chiesa non fa Politica ma sui Valori non è Neutrale, CORRIERE DELLA SERA (Oct. 22,
2010), http://www.corriere.it/esteri/10_ottobre_22/papa-politica-valori_996b118c-ddcb-11df-a41e-00144f02
aabc.shtml (discussing a very recent example of such an attitude by the Pope’s vindication for the public role
of bishops).
292 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the
Participation of Catholics in Political Life, VATICAN: HOLY SEE (Nov. 24, 2002), http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20021124_politica_en.html.
293 See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text. Some authors would probably conclude that the
Italian debate has shifted from a discussion about the existence of laicità to a discussion about the conceptions
of this principle. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
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other than Italy,294 where the role of education is considered to be critical for
constitutional as well as for social reasons.295
There are constitutional concerns due to the principle of freedom of
religion and of conscience within most European constitutions. This freedom,
together with the constitutional principle that everyone receives an
education,296 mandates that students are to be educated in accord with their
own religious and cultural identity and are enabled with the intellectual tools
that are necessary to develop personal ideas about themselves and the world.297
From this perspective, the issue of the display of the crucifix in a public
school is at stake. Some courts have maintained that the crucifix influences the
growth of the students as well as their ideas about the world and themselves;
therefore, it would violate their freedom of religion and of conscience and
endanger their education.298
The counterview stresses that the mere presence of the crucifix does not
violate a student’s freedom of religion and of conscience, nor does it endanger
the results of one’s education. It would conversely help the integration of
immigrants by displaying to them the cultural roots of the country they live
in.299
294 Among the examples that can be recalled are the cases for the crucifix in Germany and Spain. See
German Crucifix Case, supra note 232; Marco Croce, C’è un Giudice a Valladolid, FORUM DI QUADERNI
COSTITUZIONALI (Nov. 2008), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/
telescopio/0010_croce.pdf. Another example is the ban of the veil in French classrooms. Loi 2004-228 du 15
mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une
appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004
Concerning, as an Application of the Principle of the Separation of Church and State, the Wearing of Symbols
or Garb which Show Religious Affiliation in Public Primary and Secondary Schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. For a discussion
on a Spanish example, see Carmin Garcimartín, Secularism and Public Schools in Spain, SECULARISM AND
BEYOND–COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Univ. of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Den.), 1–9 (May 29–June 1,
2007), http://www.ku.dk/satsning/Religion/sekularism_and_beyond/pdf/Garcimartin_Paper.pdf.
295 See generally Marco Croce, Aggiramenti o Fraintendimenti? L’ora di Religione tra Corte
Costituzionale e Consiglio di Stato, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI (July 2010), http://www.
forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/giurisprudenza/giurisdizioni_amministrative/0
007_croce.pdf (discussing the recent accommodations of the Catholic subject at school).
296 Art. 34 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“[1] Schools are open to everyone. [2] Primary education, given for
at least eight years, is compulsory and free of tuition.”).
297 See Legge 9 febbraio 2000, n. 62 (It.).
298 See Tribunale di L’Aquila, 23 ottobre 2003, G.U. Montanaro, para. 2.2 (It.).
299 See Carlo Cardia, Carta dei Valori e Multiculturalità alla Prova della Costituzione, STATO, CHIESE E
PLURALISMO CONFESSIONALE, 13 (Dec. 2008), http://www.statoechiese.it/images/stories/2008.12/cardia_
cartam.pdf; TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3 (It.); Cons. Stato, 13 febbraio
2006, n. 556 (It.).
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Both of these vantage points have a strong cultural background. They
address the same problems that Italy is facing but from different perspectives,
consequently reaching different conclusions.
The increasing pluralism of contemporary societies has made politics much
more challenging. It is increasingly difficult to find shared solutions to
problems like same-sex marriage, euthanasia, bioethics, and abortion: societies
become more fragmented and are characterized by the presence of many
different cultures and beliefs.300
The plurality of identities is addressed by both the detractors and the
supporters of the crucifix in public schools. All believe that it is necessary to
reaffirm the existence of a set of values that must be shared by all Italians and
all the immigrants who come to live in Italy for a long period.301
There are two cultural mainstreams to the debate. On one side, there are
those who maintain that the moral frame must include traditional values, which
mainly consist of Catholic values.302 Italians, as well as foreign people living
in Italy, must engage with the history and the main culture that shaped the
country through the centuries303 in order to develop their own personality in a
constructive relationship with the environment they live in.304
On the other side, there are those who believe that the reaffirmation of the
Catholic culture would endanger the survival of Italian society because it
would consistently endorse only the majority, namely Catholics, among the
players of the cultural and social game.305 As we have seen, courts that agree
with this opinion believe that the only plausible response to the increasing
number of collective identities should be found in “neutrality” as an attitude
that must characterize public schools.306
300

ANGELO PANEBIANCO, IL POTERE, LO STATO, LA LIBERTÀ: LA GRACILE COSTITUZIONE DELLA
SOCIETÀ LIBERA 52 (2004).
301 For the document delivered by the Ministry of the Interior in order to promote the integration of
immigrants, see Carta dei Valori, della Cittadinanza e dell’Integrazione, CENTRO SCUOLE E NUOVE CULTURE
(Apr. 2007), http://www.scuolenuoveculture.org/MaterialiScaricabili/notizie/convegno_Cras/carta_valori.pdf.
302 See JOSEPH RATZINGER & MARCELLO PERA, SENZA RADICI 14 (2004).
303 See RUSCONI, supra note 285, at 107. The lack of strong secular values was filled with the well-rooted
Catholic civic values, which provided the moral and cultural framework for the nation building in the
nineteenth century and after World War II. Id. Even those who criticize the overwhelming role of Catholicism
in Italian political culture recognize that it did fill a cultural vacuum. Id.
304 RATZINGER & PERA, supra note 302, at 14.
305 Ainis, supra note 143, at 18.
306 See, e.g., Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 47c (“Le respect des convictions des parents doit être possible
dans le cadre d’une éducation capable d’assurer un environnement scolaire ouvert et favorisant l’inclusion
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The ECHR, in the first degree’s decision of the Lautsi case, endorsed this
second point of view and went even further in its reasoning.307 The Court did
not simply affirm the necessity of neutrality as an institutional and legal device
to govern pluralism.308 It also affirmed that religious culture must be kept out
of schools because it affects students’ intellectual growth.309
The personal attitude of reflecting and reaching conclusions through the
lens of reason would be in peril if students were exposed to religious thought.
This is the implication of the ECHR’s decision where it says: “The State is
obliged to the religious neutrality within the realm of mandatory public
education . . . that must instill critical thought into students.”310
It is therefore crucial to highlight that the ECHR in Lautsi’s first degree
does not simply believe religious thought to be perilous because of pluralism,
but rather it believes that religious thought is not helpful for the intellectual
growth of people. Neutrality turns out to be a device used both for the survival
of public institutions and for the sake of education since it identifies the
neutrality of the institutions with the neutrality of the intellect.
This attitude of Lautsi could have borne significant consequences for Italy
because of the influence of the ECHR over the Italian legal system.
Nevertheless, the ECHR’s attitude in Lautsi did not go along with the original
role of the European Convention and its enactment. Therefore, the Grand
Chamber’s decision in Lautsi must be welcomed, because it trimmed the
potential risks of the first degree’s decision and shortened the legal impact of
the concept of “neutrality” enabling the states to shape their own relationships
between church and state, at least partially.
CONCLUSION
Italian jurisprudence has developed different conceptions of pluralism and
of the relationship between religion and state. The recent case of the crucifix
plutôt que l’exclusion, indépendamment de l’origine sociale des élèves, des croyances religieuses ou de
l’origine ethnique. L’école ne devrait pas être le théâtre d’activités missionnaires ou de prêche; elle devrait être
un lieu de rencontre de différentes religions et convictions philosophiques, où les élèves peuvent acquérir des
connaissances sur leurs pensées et traditions respectives.”).
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. para. 56 (“L’Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de l’éducation
publique . . . qui doit chercher à inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.”). The translation is provided by the
Author of this Article.
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has highlighted these differences and demonstrated a tension between the
internal Italian debate and the ECHR’s attitude, especially in Lautsi’s first
degree. If the Grand Chamber’s decision did not correct the conception of
“neutrality” in order to allow the passive display of religious signs,311 the gap
between the first degree of Lautsi’s interpretation of the right to religious
freedom would have undermined the people’s confidence in the ECHR as a
means for the protection of human rights and may widen the cultural and
jurisprudential trends that have characterized the ongoing domestic struggle
over the display of crucifixes in schools.
The broader issue at hand, which the case of the crucifix has illuminated, is
how the ECHR perceives its powers and duties. The ECHR has surpassed its
jurisdictional authority at the expense of national autonomy by enforcing
human rights such as religious freedom.312
A. A New Fracture Between Europe, Italy, and Catholicism?
At the end of the 1980s, the Constitutional Court introduced the idea that
Italy could be defined as a state fostering laicità, but only after construing the
term to exclude its hostile connotations of French descent.313
A few years later, the constitutional jurisprudence and other judges’
decisions shifted the interpretation of constitutional provisions closer to the
French culture.314 More recently, the Administrative Tribunal of Veneto and
the Council of State went backwards by endorsing a more open and less French
conception of the principle of laicità and upholding the display of the crucifix
in public schools.315
A reflection on the positions favoring and opposing the presence of the
crucifix has demonstrated that the debate mainly concerns the relationship
between religion and state, the governance of pluralism, and the public role of
the Church of Rome.316 The tension within the jurisprudence, and the fact that

311

Lautsi II, supra note 1, para. 72.
See Anne Peters, The Applicability of the European Convention of Human Rights in Times of Complex
Jurisdiction and the Principle of Fundamental Rights Tolerance, 48 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 1, 1–57
(2010).
313 Corte Cost., 11 aprile 1989, n. 203, para. 4 (It.).
314 Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.).
315 Lautsi I, supra note 1.
316 See supra Part III.A–B.
312
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there were such strong changes in the jurisprudence within a few years,
demonstrate that the debate continues.
The reasons for the debate are to be found in the very basis of the
constitutional jurisprudence about laicità. The same use of the expression
laicità has fueled the debate rather than pushing it toward a solution.317 Even
though the Constitutional Court was careful in depicting this principle as a
means to preserve pluralism and foster religious freedom, the use of the term
unavoidably lends to different interpretations because it is deeply linked to the
French constitutional tradition that demands a strict separation between church
and state.318 This is exactly what happened starting from the late 1990s in the
constitutional jurisprudence and then among other Italian courts.319
Nevertheless, the largest part of Italian society endorses the public role of
Catholicism and the display of the crucifix in public schools, which is the
primary reason for such a popular reaction against the ECHR’s first degree
decision.320
In the first degree of Lautsi, the ECHR intervened on two critical points of
the Italian debate. The first point concerns the principle of laicità. The Court
maintained that the only attitude that is able to grant religious freedom for all
and to govern pluralism is “neutrality,” which mainly consists of keeping a
strong separation between religion and state.321
The second point concerned the role of Catholicism and of Catholic values
in shaping civic virtues in Italy. The Catholic influence on Italian society has
been preserved and even fostered by some Italian jurisprudence322 and
scholarship323 because it has provided Italians with moral values that were
needed after the creation of the state and even after the reconstruction
following World War II.
The ECHR in its first degree took the opposite vantage point. It reasoned
that public education did not need religious values and stated that religious
education is in conflict with the growth of people who are able to use their own
317 Victor L. Simpson, European Unity Tested Over Crucifixes in the Classroom,
2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38062809/ns/world_news-europe/.
318 See, e.g., Corte Cost., 19 giugno 1997, n. 235 (It.).
319 See id.
320 See Simpson, supra note 317.
321 Lautsi I, supra note 1, paras. 56–57.
322 TAR Veneto, sez. terza, 22 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3 (It.).
323 MARCELLO PERA, PERCHÉ DOBBIAMO DIRCI CRISTIANI 59 (2008).

MSNBC.COM

(July 2,
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reason.324 According to that ECHR decision, religious influence was not
conducive for the development of a good citizenry, particularly with regard to
young people.325
The main Italian reaction considered the ECHR to be attacking the very
roots of Italian institutions and society.326 The Court seemed to have taken a
position in the cultural war between secularization and religious liberty. Such a
position was akin to the jurisprudence of the late Constitutional Court327 and
other Italian courts’ decisions on state and religion.328 The ECHR’s position, in
the first Lautsi decision, however, was far from the prevailing position in
Italian culture and would have decreased the Court’s popularity in Italy. The
decision undermined Italian confidence in the European Convention’s
usefulness as a tool to protect human rights, and to secure pluralism and
stability.329 From this vantage point, the very recent Grand Chamber’s
decision, which reversed the judgment of the first degree upholding the display
of the crucifix in Italian public schools330 has restored some confidence331 that
the protection of human rights is consistent with a plurality of models of
relationship between church and state.
B. A Critical Decision: The Gap Between Freedom of Religion, Separation of
Church and State, and Religious Cultures as a Means to Govern Pluralism
The disappointment of Italian political institutions and a large part of
Italian society comes also from the debatable attitude of the ECHR. The
ECHR’s attitude actually supplants the very basis of many European states’
constitutional systems with new ones, which are based on a broad
interpretation of the European Convention’s articles.332 The Lautsi case reveals
324

Lautsi I, supra note 1, para. 56.
Id.
326 See Simpson, supra note 317.
327 This phase started with Decision Number 440. See Corte Cost., 18 ottobre 1995, n. 440 (It.); see also
Stelio Mangiameli, L’identità dell’Europa: Laicità e Libertà Religiosa, FORUM DI QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI,
15–16 (Nov. 2009), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/paper/0153_
mangiameli.pdf.
328 See Cass., 1 marzo 2000, n. 439 (It.).
329 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Editorial, Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1
(2010).
330 Lautsi II, supra note 1.
331 See Marta Cartabia, La Corte del Buon Senso, ILSUSSIDARIO.NET (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.
ilsussidiario.net/News/Editoriale/2011/3/21/La-Corte-del-buon-senso/160426.
332 Rainer Arnold, The European Constitution and the Transformation of National Constitutional Law, in
A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: THE ICG, THE RATIFICATION PROCESS AND BEYOND 1, 1–5 (Ingolf Pernice &
Jirí Zemánek eds., 2005), available at http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/book_prag/ArnoldFinal.pdf.
325
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this trend quite clearly in the first degree’s decision,333 while the Grand
Chamber’s one334 diminishes the impact of the ECHR’s attitude.
The ECHR’s decisions take a precise path between religious freedom and
neutrality.335 Particularly the first degree’s decision gave neutrality the
characteristics of a strong separation between religion and state. The ECHR
had followed this path in prior decisions, particularly in using the principles of
freedom of education and freedom of religion to identify some of the central
features of a state dedicated to protecting human rights.336
Then, the ECHR declared, as it had said before, that the principle of state
neutrality toward religion is a necessary consequence of the principle of
religious liberty, even though the Convention makes no such claims.337
According to the Court, the only way for the state to protect the religious
freedom of everyone is by keeping a neutral attitude, equidistant from any
particular confession.338 The state cannot grant any special privilege or position
to any religious confession.339 If the state were to do so, this would violate the
principle of neutrality and consequently would violate the protection of
religious freedom. According to this argument, the ECHR endorses the basic
principle of neutrality as the only doctrine that effectively protects religious
liberty for all, and, coming to the Lautsi case, the ECHR finds its place among
the Italian supporters of neutrality.340 The Grand Chamber’s decision simply
confirmed the necessity that the states adopt a neutral and impartial
approach.341

333

Lautsi I, supra note 1.
Lautsi II, supra note 1.
335 More recently, neutrality was mentioned by the ECHR in other meaningful decisions. See, e.g.,
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 99, 119, 181 (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/homepage_EN (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by
placing “Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow” in the “Case Title” box and “Russia” in the “Respondent State”
box); Grzelak v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 86 (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_EN (follow
“Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Grzelak” in the “Case Title”
box and “Poland” in the “Respondent State” box).
336 E.g., Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
337 Meaningful affirmations on the relationship between neutrality and religious freedom can be found in
many judgments. E.g., Dogru v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage_EN
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search by placing “Dogru” in the “Case
Title” box and “France” in the “Respondent State” box).
338 E.g., id.
339 Id.
340 Lautsi I, supra note 1.
341 Lautsi II, supra note 1, para. 60.
334
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From several points of view, the ECHR’s conclusion seems excessive. It is
worth focusing on Lautsi’s first degree342 because it is more explicit in
canvassing the new role of the ECHR and therefore its defects can be more
easily detected.
First, the decision does not seem to respect the classic role that the Court
has had in providing a common framework for the protection of human rights
in Europe. The Court had previously granted a margin of appreciation to
participating states in developing its religious freedom jurisprudence precisely
in order to give the European Convention a reasonable degree of flexibility and
to allow the states enough room to shape rights differently in accordance with
their own traditions and constitutional regimes.343 The states thereby retained
meaningful discretion in balancing these basic rights and liberties according to
their cultural, religious, and legal backgrounds.344 The margin of appreciation
doctrine implied a pluralism of models of relationship between church and
state. But the ECHR has lately tended to promote more expansive universal
models and methods of protecting human rights rather than just using the
Convention to ensure a basic level of protection in each participating state.345
The Lautsi case is one of the most recent examples of this new trend.346 In
order to govern pluralism in the European Convention’s states, the ECHR has
decreased the states’ pluralism in shaping their own model of church and state
relations.
Second, there is no evidence that neutrality is implicitly embedded in
Article 9 of the European Convention, notwithstanding what the Court
maintains.347 The Court links neutrality to religious freedom, as protected by

342

Lautsi I, supra note 1.
For the origin of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
344 Id. The margin of appreciation finds its roots in the broad provisions of the European Convention,
which provides a long list of possible exceptions and limitations to the same rights they affirm:
343

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 9, para. 2.
345 The case of the crucifix is not the first one on which the ECHR has abandoned the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation. Its gradual disappearance from the Court’s jurisprudence has been repeatedly lamented
by scholars in different fields and circumstances. E.g., Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
346 Lautsi I, supra note 1.
347 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 9.
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Article 9 within the Convention.348 Nevertheless, Article 9 not only lacks any
explicit mention of neutrality as an aspect of religious liberty, but one cannot
even find any mention of it in the drafting of Article 9.349 According to the
records, the drafters agreed on an open affirmation of religious liberty, but
apparently they did not discuss neutrality or other similar implications of the
right of religious liberty.350
The Grand Chamber’s decision in Lautsi does correct the first degree’s
judgment on the first point, while it confirms the first degree’s attitude on the
second one.351 In fact, the Grand Chamber concedes that the states own a
relevant margin of appreciation in shaping their own relationship between
education, teaching, and religious traditions.352 Nevertheless, their margin of
appreciation lies within the boundaries of “neutrality”: all the states must be
neutral and impartial.353 The pluralism that is allowed by the ECHR does not
contemplate not-impartial or not-neutral states.
The ECHR’s attitude, even in the Grand Chamber’s decision, narrows the
pluralism of state models of the church-state relationship while fostering an
ideal of “neutrality.”354 It endangers the very model of the European state.355
Through its decisions, the ECHR pushes states to a precise model of
relationship with religion: the neutral one. Since the Court clearly endorses the
principle of neutrality as the only method to grant freedom of religion and
education, one can question whether the established churches or official
religions of other European states could survive scrutiny if challenged under
the European Convention. Even though the Grand Chamber admits that the
European states are very different in their cultural and historical backgrounds
348

See supra notes 337–41 and accompanying text.
The travaux préparatoires for the Convention—especially for Articles 6, 9, and 13—are evidence that
the drafters were mainly concerned with the limitations to religious liberty that Turkey wanted to impose in
order to prevent Islamic fundamentalism and with the duties that Sweden imposed on Lutherans as they
belonged to the official religion of the state. “Travaux Préparatoires” of the Convention (ECHR), LIBR. EUR.
CT. HUM. RTS. (May 2, 2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/library/colentravauxprep.html (select a link under the
“Language” column to view the travaux préparatoires for a particular article in either English or French).
350 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a Guiding
Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 388–89 (Mark K. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999).
351 Lautsi II, supra note 1.
352 Id. para. 69.
353 Id. para. 60.
354 See Luca P. Vanoni, I Simboli Religiosi e la Libertà di Educare in Europa: Uniti nella Diversità o
Uniti nella Neutralità?, RIVISTA DELL’ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI, 6–7 (Feb. 2010),
http://www.rivistaaic.it/sites/default/files/tmp/Vanoni01.pdf.
355 LUCA DIOTALLEVI, UNA ALTERNATIVA ALLA LAICITÀ 34 (2010) (illustrating the deep link between the
conception of state and the role of neutrality in the public square).
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and that under the Convention they have the power to decide “whether or not
to perpetuate a tradition,”356 it is not sure if they can resist the scrutiny of state
neutrality. After all, the crucifix was legitimized by the fact that it is a “passive
symbol,”357 meaning that it has a very secondary role in public education. But
the presence of Anglican bishops in the House of Lords and other public
institutions of the United Kingdom is likely to violate the Convention because
it fosters the idea of a privileged religion rather than impartiality.358 The same
might be said for Denmark with its established Lutheran Church.359 Similarly,
the Irish Constitution could be challenged, since its preamble begins:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and
to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be
referred,
We, the people of Éire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus
360
Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial . . . .

A similar fate would befall the Constitution of Greece, which opens
similarly: “In the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible
Trinity.”361
In brief, such a strict enforcement of Article 9 using state neutrality would
cast doubt on the validity of several European constitutions, the very first
political symbols of these states of Europe, because they openly endorse
specific forms of religion. Such a rigid interpretation of the principle of
religious freedom makes the very fundamentals of some European countries
illegitimate.
If the Court does not want to go so far, then the rationale of the ECHR must
be reconsidered and the same meaning of “neutrality” must be read as
something different from constitutional impartiality and neutrality. To do
otherwise would be inconsistent with both the intention of the states that
356

Lautsi II, supra note 1, para. 68.
Id. para. 72.
358 Fulvio Cortese, Il Crocefisso e gli “Imbarazzi” del Giurista, FORUM DI QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI,
2 (Oct. 2010), http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/index.php?option=com_file_index&key=1833&name=
0006_cortese.pdf.
359 DANMARKS RIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, Part I, § 4 (Den.) (“The Evangelical
Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by the
State.”).
360 IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl.
361 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] pmbl. (Greece).
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signed the Convention as well as with the contemporary legal and political
environment. Moreover, it would diminish the possibilities that the states have
to decide their own models of church and state relations, and therefore narrow
the pluralism of state models. The disappointment with the first decision in the
crucifix case will probably disappear in Italy because the Grand Chamber
reversed that decision. But it might return elsewhere if constitutional aspects of
European states are scrutinized through the ECHR’s lens of neutrality.

